THE INTERNET AND THE PROJECT OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW
Susan P. Crawford
The internet offers the potential for economic growth stemming from online
human communications, but, as Professor Susan Crawford discusses in this
article, recent industry and government actions have disfavored these
possibilities by treating the internet like a content-delivery supply chain.
She recommends that the internet be at the center of communications policy
and that laws affecting internet access be evaluated in terms of whether
they further U.S. economic growth by facilitating increased emergent online
diversity. Professor Crawford criticizes the nearly exclusive focus of
communications policy on the private economic success of infrastructure
and “application” providers, and suggests that communications policy be
focused on facilitating communications themselves.
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Stephen Hawking: "I think the next century will be the century of
complexity."1
Anyone with a substantial amount of internet experience thinks of
the internet as a thriving conversation-pit, news source, and job resource,
access to which is nearly as necessary as oxygen. The internet’s value to
people does not come from the nature of the connections we use to access it
but, rather, from the human communications and relationships made
possible by its universal interconnectivity and flexibility. Because no
particular use of the internet is embedded in its design, new ideas and new
forms of human relationships constantly emerge from its use. Both the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the companies that
provide highspeed access to the internet in the U.S., however, assume that
the internet is a content-delivery supply chain – much like a railroad – that
is a souped-up version of earlier communications modalities.
The first generation of internet scholars made strong arguments
about the importance of the “end to end” principle of the internet, set forth
in a classic paper by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark.2 That principle suggests that
the transport functions of the internet should not be involved in finegrained operations on messages because an intelligent network will impose
costs that would be much more efficiently dealt with at the end-user edge.3
In colloquial terms, the end to end argument is that the network should be
stupid and its edges should be smart.4 Larry Lessig, Mark Lemley, Yochai
Benkler, Kevin Werbach, Tim Wu, Richard Whitt, Lawrence Solum, and
many others have linked the end to end principle to future innovation,
noting that transport non-discrimination allows new applications (like email
or the World Wide Web) to be introduced by anyone without their having to
ask permission.5
1

T. Irene Sanders & Judith A. McCabe, The Use of Complexity Science: Report to the
US Dept of Education 5 (2003), available at http://www.hcs.ucla.edu/DoEreport.pdf.
2
Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed & David D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277-88 (Nov. 1984),
available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/.
3
See infra n.__. The internet’s layered architecture separates transport (the lowest
layer) from the packetizing and addressing protocol (the TCP/IP suite or logical layer) used
by computing devices. TCP/IP can work across (above) any form of transport and is, in
turn, used by applications running above TCP/IP, such as the domain name system, email,
and the World Wide Web. See infra Section __.
4
See David Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, available at
http://www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html.
5
See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, The Architecture of Internet 2.0, RELEASE 1.0, Feb. 1999,
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This focus on the application-layer view – celebrating the advent of
Wikipedia, YouTube, eBay, Second Life, blogging software, and other new
substitutes for the delivery-chain applications of the pre-internet era –
provides an impoverished (or at least incomplete) perspective on
communications. The landscape of the internet can usefully be perceived
differently: Human online communications are best captured intellectually
as a complex adaptive system that can generate economic growth. New
forms of persistent social interaction (often crossing application boundaries)
are quickly evolving in direct reaction to collective human attention, and
these communications are creating opportunities for the development of
new ideas and new ways of making a living. This has never happened
before at the same rate, with the same directness, or with similarly
persistent results.6
Although the application-focused view of the internet landscape
prompts observers to see the internet as a content-delivery supply chain,
communications online are much more than arranged chunks of remixed
at 1, available at http://www.edventure.com/release1/cable.html; Tim Wu, ApplicationCentered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163 (1999); Yochai Benkler, From
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation toward Sustainable
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34-35 (2001);
Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 970 (2001) [hereinafter End of
End-to-End]; Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. OF TELECOMM. &
HIGH-TECH L. 37 (2002) [hereinafter Layered]; Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice:
Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 59, 95 (2005) [hereinafter Breaking the Ice]; Lawrence Solum & Minn Chung,
The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815
(2004); Mark Lemley & Brett Frischmann, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007)
[hereinafter Spillovers]; Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A
New Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J.
587 (2004) [hereinafter Horizontal Leap]; Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information
Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM & HIGH-TECH. L. 1, 4-5 (2002); Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003)
[hereinafter Broadband Discrimination]; Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s
Guide, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004) [hereinafter User’s Guide]; Letter from
Tim Wu & Lawrence Lessig to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 5 (Aug. 22, 2003),
available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf (“The Internet has long
functioned as a figurative ‘platform’ for a fierce and highly innovative competition
between applications.”)
6
By contrast, telephone communications allow for quick one-to-one reactions, but the
resulting patterns vanish as soon as the connection is ended. Broadcast is slightly more
complex than telephony, but viewers’ reactions to what they see have a very attentuated
relationship to what is eventually shown. See infra Section __.

4

THE PROJECT OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW

[11-Feb-07

content or new category-destroying applications. Online communications
coalesce into dynamic human relationships, made possible by a globally
addressable network of computers, that evolve unpredictably in response to
their environment. These relationships are sometimes rendered visible by
particular applications (for example, MySpace and eBay show visually what
group of actors is interested in a particular object or person), but more often
are like the invisible human groupings made possible by a great city. These
relationships, pulled together by interest and accident and characterized by
shifting boundaries and unpredictable dynamics, are what is so attractive
about the internet.7 So although “innovation” is indeed supported when an
inventor of a new form of telephony or television does not have to ask
permission to introduce her new service online, and the application-layer
perspective helpfully illuminates why this is so, new and innovative
applications (or “services”) are not the key story of the internet. The central
story is a deeply human one about unpredictably complex relationships.
Scholars and policymakers continue to be focused on the
application-layer view. Many telecommunications law scholars have
suggested that communications regulation should be tailored to the layered
architecture of the internet (and thus should treat transport differently than
applications), but their primary justification for such tailoring has been that
it will “track[ ] the reality of convergence” – in other words, that regulation
should recognize that former broadcast and telephony “services” are now
being delivered online.8 They see the interest of the internet in applicationlayer terms.9 This same supply-chain, application-layer perspective is now
7

J.C.R. Licklider, who led the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, now
DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and encouraged the
networking that led to the internet, predicted this development in 1968: “What will on-line
interactive communities be like? In most fields they will consist of geographically
separated members, sometimes grouped in small clusters and sometimes working
individually. They will be communities not of common location, but of common interest.”
J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device, SCIENCE
TECHNOLOGY,
April
1968,
available
at
AND
http://scpd.stanford.edu/sonnet/player.aspx?GUID=6F704E8F-352F-42E0-BC583F9014EA1F81 (emphasis in original).
8
See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice, supra note __, at 59 (2005) (“By shifting
regulatory structures from vertical silos based on network platform to horizontal layers, the
layered approach tracks the reality of convergence.”)
9
Tim Wu has often argued that what is important about the internet is the competition
it allows among applications. Wu also assumes that distinguishing between different
categories of online “services” (telephony-speak for “applications”) is appropriate: a strong
claim that is only possible if one is firmly within the application-layer perspective. See,
e.g., Tim Wu, Broadband Discrimination, supra note __; Tim Wu, Why Have a
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being adopted by opponents of end-to-end, “stupid network” connectivity,
most famously Christopher Yoo, who has argued that negative effects of
requiring nondiscrimination by internet access providers would include
narrowing of “consumer choice” by disfavoring applications that require
quality of service guarantees.10
From the application-competition
perspective, network operators can appeal to consumers’ intuitions that
entities like Google providing online “services” should pay the carriers for
the privilege of reaching carrier subscribers, and Google and others can
argue that nascent applications will be stifled by this kind of
discrimination.11 These arguments present zero-sum games and are likely
perceived by non-techies as abacus beads moving back and forth on a single
wire of money-making zeal. From the complex systems perspective,
something much more interesting than supply-chain delivery is occurring.
Use of the internet is changing in unpredictable and complex ways as
people discover increased degrees of freedom of human connection made
possible online.
Network operators want to control and monetize highspeed access to
the internet.12 They believe that they can and should control this complex
system by slowing down its evolution and keeping its adaptation attached to
old “service” understandings; they believe that it is appropriate to dumb
down users’ relationships to this complex system by, among other things,
deliberately degrading upload speeds and keeping highspeed access for their

Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006). In an important early article, Larry Lessig and
Mark Lemley suggested that the crucial differentiator of internet architecture was that it
“enabl[ed] a wider variety of applications to connect and use the network.” Mark Lemley
& Lawrence Lessig, End of End-to-End, supra note ___. Kevin Werbach has continued
this approach. Kevin Werbach, Layered, supra note __, at 38-40; Kevin Werbach,
Breaking the Ice, supra note ___, at 95..
10
Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1847, 1907-08 (2006) [hereinafter Economics of Congestion]; Christopher S. Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13-18 (2005) [hereinafter Beyond].
11
AT&T CEO Edward Whitacre has said that Google and other companies "'use my
lines for free--and that's bull."' Spencer E. Ante & Roger O. Crockett, Rewired and Ready
for Combat: SBC and Verizon Are Spending Billions to Stay Competitive in the Broadband
Era, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 110. Vint Cerf, on behalf of Google, has testified that
“[w]e care passionately about the future of the Net, not just for ourselves, but because of all
the other potential Googles out there.” Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (February 7,
2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist Google
Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
12
See infra Section __.
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own content.13
Other countries (most vividly Korea and Japan) have taken a hard
look at their communications policy and have understood that
communications and economic growth are tightly intertwined. Economists
understand that economic growth is driven by new ideas creating evernewer goods and services.14 The human relations made possible by the
internet are capable of producing enormously diverse ideas (ideas in the
form of new niches, new roles, and new understandings of information) and
allowing them to be disseminated on a large scale, thus triggering crucial
economic growth that will benefit society as a whole. Conversely, the cost
to the U.S. economy of adopting a taming, constraining approach to
complex online communications by making them simple and predictable
may be great. We are at risk of encouraging the development of a sclerotic,
dumbed-down, cable television version of the internet for U.S. users.
This Article seeks to change the perspective from which we examine
the landscape of the internet and the project of communications law. The
internet should be at the center of communications policy in this country
and the highest priority of communications policy should be to facilitate
human online communications (and thus new ideas) rather than optimize
conditions for particular private infrastructure providers. This facilitation
will speed economic growth.15
Part I lays out the background for this project. The story of how the
internet has unseated core assumptions about basic features of the
communications landscape is a familiar one. Applications are secondary to
the human communications and relationships that they facilitate, however.
Part II begins to develop a theoretical grounding for a changed approach to
communications law as a whole, focusing on the complexity of human
communications online and the increasing returns associated with these
communications. The economic growth-based theory is straightforward:
the greatest possible diversity of new ideas that will support our country in
the future will come from the online world, because of its special
13

See infra Section __.
See, e.g., Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and New Developments in the Theory of
Growth, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 3098 (Sept. 1989); Paul Romer, Endogenous
Technological Change, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 3210 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter
Endogenous]; DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (2006)
[hereinafter KNOWLEDGE].
15
See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007)
(“The production of networked space, including cyberspace, should proceed in ways that
promote the well-being of the embodied, situated beings who inhabit it.”).
14
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affordances of interactivity, interconnectivity, and unpredictable evolution.
Communications law and policy should therefore have the internet at its
center. Part III briefly explores current debates about universal access and
network neutrality in light of this reconception of communications law. If,
as I suggest, human online communications are a complex system that is
creating value for human beings, then attempts by network operators to
transform the internet into something resembling older broadcast and
telephony models pose great risks to our collective future.
Current communications law has drifted very far from the
experience of actual end-users. The time has come to explore new theories.
We need to have a new understanding of “optimizing” and a new subject for
“optimization”: communications themselves.
I. THE FIRST GENERATION OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
In the first generation of communications law, technical
infrastructure and function were closely associated. This approach shaped
the siloed Telecommunications Acts of 1934 and 1996, which feature
separate titles for separate infrastructures -- broadcast, (later) cable, and
telephony.16 The first generation of internet scholars made clear that the
commercial internet fundamentally undermined core assumptions about
basic features of this communications landscape. This Part briefly describes
the changes caused by the advent of the internet, outlines the incumbents’
responses to these changes, and reveals the scholars’ application-layer
perspective on this sequence of events.
A. The Internet Sweeps Aside Silos
From the media theorist perspective, communications traditionally
have been made up of three broadly different modalities: telephony/postal
(one-to-one, often having to do with the daily events of human life); the
press (one-to-many, often having to do with expert views as to trends
16

47 U.S.C. tit. II, tit. III, and tit. VI (2003), Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Most, but not all sections of the 1996 Act amended the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § § 151-612 (1994). See Douglas C. Sicker,
Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, Paper Presented at the
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference ("TPRC") 4 (2002), available at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf (explaining that
in the U.S. silo model, each network and service is regulated separately from the other, and
"the top defines the regulatory Title").

8

THE PROJECT OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW

[11-Feb-07

revealed by the daily events of human life); and cinema/broadcasting (also
one-to-many, often having to do with entertainment for its own sake, and
including literary communication).17 From the perspective of traditional
telecommunications law, communications have been divided into two large
categories: regulated radio/broadcast/telephony (dependent on radio or
wired communications, and subject to “public trustee”18 or common
carriage19 obligations) and largely-unregulated newspaper/cinema (the
“print” model, not dependent on radio or wired communications) spheres.20
Congress has delegated to the FCC statutory authority over
telecommunications providers, wireless carriers, satellite and cable
providers, and broadcasters.
For all of these actors, the nature of the “services” they provide has
been tightly tied to the hardware or infrastructure on which they are based.
Indeed, the first generation of communications law assumes that there is a
necessary association between a particular form of infrastructure and a
particular functional capacity. Each of the traditional modalities of
communication has had its preferred use embedded in its design, and a key
goal of current law is to produce the optimum level of investment in each of
several independent types of infrastructure: broadcast, telephony, cable,
and wireless. And from the perspective of past “users” of communications,
all of these activities (radio, broadcast television, telephony, postal services,
newspaper, cinema, cable) were until recently seen as separate.
17

See, e.g., PAUL STARR, CREATION OF THE MEDIA (2004).
See Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 97 (2003) (outlining public trustee obligations of broadcasters).
19
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 2006 defines common carriers (in a
circular fashion) as companies “engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio in interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy.” 47 U.S.C. Sec. § 153(10). A common carrier is a company that “makes a public
offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who
choose such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing.” FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979). See 47 U.S.C. § 202
(2000) (prohibiting common carriers from engaging in unjust or unreasonable
discrimination, including making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference, or
imposing any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, on any person, class or
persons or locality).
20
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (supporting value of
editorial autonomy for print model); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (finding that the government can intervene in licensed broadcasting to promote
public values). See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 2 (1984)
(“The principles of common carriage and of the First Amendment have been applied to
broadcasting in only atrophied form. For broadcasting, a politically managed system has
been invented.”)
18
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Now, given the advent of the internet, none of these categorization
systems works. Connections to the internet provide access to online
activities that are the functional equivalents of all of these former modalities
and are not necessarily tied to the hardware used to reach them.21 Use of
old-style specialized communications mechanics is diminishing. For
example, veteran internet users say they spend less time watching television
than they used to.22 The U.S. Postal Service has had to retrench by
removing underused mailboxes from city streets.23 Telephone companies
are losing money quickly on their traditional wireline businesses – cable
companies are threatening both their telephone revenues and internet access
revenues.24 Many mainstream internet companies are joining the VoIP
marketplace (Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, AOL all have their own VoIP
applications) and VoIP is increasingly substituted for phone usage: As of
21

See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
Anuk Jesdanum, Parents More Worried About TV Time Than Internet Use,
Associated Press, Nov. 29, 2006 (reporting that 41% of veteran internet users say they
spend
less
time
watching
television),
available
at
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/54472.html); University of Southern California
Center for the Digital Future, 2007 Digital Future Project Report (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/2007-Digital-Future-Report-Press-Release-112906.pdf.
For demise of broadcasting, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal
Communication Commission's National Television Ownership Cap: What's Bad for
Broadcasting is Good for the Country, 46 WM. & MARY L.REV. 439, 483 (2004) (noting
decline in percentage of television market of broadcast content plus substitution of internet
content for broadcast). See also John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The
Challenge of Rewriting Telecommunications from the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 95, 96 (2002) (“Digital television, digital cable, internet telephony, and the
internet itself all take a communication, convert it into a series of digital signals, transmit
those digital signals between distant points, and then allow a computer at the distant point
(whether a PC, TV, telephone, Personal Video Recorder or some other device) to
reconstruct the digital bits into high quality copies of the original images, information or
sounds.”).
23
Katie Hafner, Postal Service Finds a Friend in the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2006, at B-4 (“In 2005, revenue from first-class mail like cards and letters, which still made
up more than half the Postal Service’s total sales of $66.6 billion, dropped nearly 1 percent
from 2004.”).
24
E.g., “BellSouth ... said that its total access lines, including those for phone service
and high-speed Internet access, declined 6.9 percent from [2005] to 19 million at the end of
the third quarter [of 2006]. The company lost about 301,000 local phone lines.” Reuters,
Wireless Boosts Profits for Cingular’s Parents, NEWS.COM, Oct. 4, 2006. “During 2005,
for example, the number of fixed telephone lines operated by Verizon, America's secondlargest telecoms firm, declined by 8%.” Tom Standage, “Convergence” Is the Telecoms
Industry’s New Mantra, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2006. “Deutsche Telekom lost 1m
fixed-line subscribers in the first half of the year, and of the 400,000 broadband lines it
activated in the past 12 months, over 95% were for its rivals to resell.” Swamp Things,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2006.
22
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the preparation of this article, there has been a 153% increase in VoIP
subscribers in 2006 over 2005, with almost seven million subscribers in the
U.S.25
The internet’s effect on mainstream press activities has been even
more dramatic. According to The New York Times, the U.S. newspaper
industry “appears to be in a free fall.”26 The last six months have seen an
unequalled decline in circulation for U.S. papers.27 Meanwhile, however,
the readership of online newspapers sites in 2006 is nearly one-third higher
than in 2005.28 A recent Pew Internet & American Life Project study found
that almost 20% of adult internet users were obtaining political news
online.29 After Katrina, half of all online users looked for news online
about the event.30 Now that broadband access to the internet is growing
quickly, already more than half of online users in the U.S. are able to watch
video online.31 This is having a great effect on traditional one-to-many
cinema and broadcasting communications modalities. The obvious example
is YouTube, named Invention of the Year by Time Magazine for 2006 and
recently purchased by Google for more than $1.6 billion.32 The accessequipped personal computer now makes it possible for anyone to be
Benjamin Franklin in an era of digital video: providing access to the mails,
printing newspapers, and broadcasting views. From the perspective of
current users of the internet, the boundaries between these old modalities
25

Cable providers control sixty percent of that market, and Vonage serves about forty
percent of it. VoIP subscriber base grows 21% in second quarter – report, AMERICAS
NETWORK, Aug. 10, 2006. Devices are now being introduced that are more like PCs than
phones, and allow developers to create their own applications (including, most obviously,
VoIP applications) without the permission of the mobile carriers. See Charlie Demerjian, A
Truly Open Linux Phone with GPS Debuts: Openmoko Opens Up the Airwaves, THE
INQUIRER, Nov. 8, 2006.
26
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Katharine Q. Seelye, Ex-Chief of G.E. May Want
Newspaper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006.
27
Jeff Jarvis, Newspapers In Free Fall, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2006.
28
Id.
29
Memorandum from John B. Horrigan, Associate Director, Pew Internet & American
Life
Project
study,
Politics
Online
(Aug.
2006),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Politics%20Aug06_Memo.pdf.
30
Pew Internet & American Life Project study, Major News Events, Nov. 2005.
31
Brian Morrissey, Half of Internet Users Watch Video, ADWEEK, Oct. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.multicastmedia.com/pressreleases/News20051014a.aspx.
32
“YouTube had tapped into something that appears on no business plan: the lonely,
pressurized, pent-up video subconscious of America. Having started with a single video of
a trip to the zoo in April of last year, YouTube now airs 100 million videos--and its users
add 70,000 more--every day.” Best Inventions 2006, TIME, available at
http://www.time.com/time/2006/techguide/bestinventions/inventions/youtube2.html.
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are disappearing, and these modalities are becoming indistinguishable bitbased activities online.
But more than mere substitution is going on. The important thing to
users, the thing that is so attractive about the internet, is that it connects
them to other people (and groups of other people) in dynamic ways.33 The
internet can do more than just transport bits and facilitate momentary
person-to-person communications. It can also provide a substrate for new
forms of social relationships, created by many different decisions to pay
attention.34 The internet, and the graphical networked screen, allows the
formation of persistent human connections and relationships that fail or
flourish depending on whether people pay attention to them. The identity of
the particular pipes or wires used to access the internet means nothing to
users—no more, at least, than the driver of a bus cares who poured the
concrete used in building the road over which the bus travels.
In the first, and still dominant, generation of communications law,
technical infrastructure and function were thought to be necessarily (and
appropriately) associated. But the internet by disassociating infrastructure
from function threatens incumbent network access providers (formerly
known as cable, telephony, and wireless companies). Those that are
threatened are fighting back because their economic stake in the firstgeneration approach is great.35 The FCC, accustomed to the first generation
33

University of Southern California Center for the Digital Future, 2007 Digital Future
Project Report (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/2007-DigitalFuture-Report-Press-Release-112906.pdf (“Internet use is growing and evolving as an
instrument for personal engagement – through blogs, personal Web sites, and online
communities.”). Pew Internet and American Life Reports: The Internet as a Resource for
News and Information about Science, Nov. 20, 2006 (fully 87% of online users have at one
time used the internet to carry out research on a scientific topic or concept); Social
Networking Websites and Teens, Jan. 7, 2007 (more than half of all online American
youths ages 12-17 use online social networking sites); Tagging, Jan. 31, 2007 (almost a
third of internet users have tagged or categorized content online such as photos, news
stories or blog posts), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/.
34
Early examples of such social groups include World of Warcraft guilds that meet
outside the boundaries of the WoW application, Second Life businesses that provide a
living in real world dollars, see Daniel Terdiman, Business Consulting Comes to ‘Second
Life,’ CNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 21, 2006, and innumerable online collaborating groups. See
Consider a Virtual Company To Get a Flexible Work Life, Brazen Careerist,
http://blog.penelopetrunk.com/2006/10/01/consider-a-virtual-company-to-get-a-flexiblework-life/, (Oct. 1, 2006); Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153; Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, 10 FIRST
MONDAY 11, (November 2005), available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_11/
noveck/index.html.
35
This Article focuses on the defensive activities of incumbent network access
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approach, is responding to the changes caused by the advent of the internet
by protecting old-style communications modalities even as they become
indistinguishable online bits.36
B. The Incumbents Respond
The internet was introduced into a sphere of communications that
was completely controlled by pre-divestiture AT&T and, later, the Bell
telephone companies. The connectivity required to allow computers to send
data to each other – the physical transport layer – was initially made up of
phone lines.37 The original engineers who designed the simple network
protocols that created the layer independence that drove the development of
the internet did not spend much time thinking about connectivity. They just
tried to find it. Larry Roberts, the director of ARPA’s (Advanced Research
Projects Agency) networking project in the late 1960s, leased high-capacity
phone lines from AT&T that linked the ARPA sites at all times.38 Doug
Engelbart, the Stanford Research Institute researcher who gave a worldchanging demonstration of human-computer interaction in December 1968,
leased telephone and video links to make interactive computing visible to

providers. A complete discussion of all the incumbent-protective activity with respect to
the internet is beyond the scope of this Article. See Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the
Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603, 635 (2003) (content industry strikes
back); Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, The Squad Car, and the Internet, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 873 (2006) (law enforcement and telcos strike back, aided by third-party
vendors of services to law enforcement and telcos – as well as the FCC); Susan P.
Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (telcos and
cablecos fight back by using the image of the Romantic Builder).
36
The development of the FCC as an institution has arguably led to a path-dependent
pattern of treating new technologies like revised versions of old ones; regulatory
convenience and bureaucratic necessity both drive in this direction. See DOUGLASS
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS) (1990).
37
The principle behind the logical architecture of the internet can be visualized as an
hourglass standing flat on a table. The narrow neck itself is made up of the simple network
protocols that represent precise agreements to do certain tasks in a certain way – to chunk
information into packets of particular sizes, to label them in particular ways, and to send
them along their (indeterminate) way towards globally unique addresses. Below the neck
are physical transport links (copper telephone lines, coaxial cable television wires, fiber
optic cable, satellite transmission channels), and above the neck are “applications,” or
programs that structure information so as to make it useful for humans and machines.
38
MITCHELL WALDROP, THE DREAM MACHINE 272 (2001).
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his audience.39 Connectivity was always an issue. Tim Berners-Lee, the
inventor of the World Wide Web application, has written about going to a
key conference in Texas (Hypertext ’91) and trying to demonstrate the
World Wide Web for the first time. He had to persuade a hotel manager to
string a phone line into the hall outside the main meeting room, persuade a
local university to give him dial-in service to the internet, and get his Swiss
modem to work with the American electrical system by taking the modem
apart, borrowing a soldering gun, and wiring the modem directly to a power
adapter.40
These engineers were using telephone lines for connectivity but not
for the lines’ embedded architecture. At the outset of the ARPA networking
project, Larry Roberts deliberately rejected the telephone system’s circuitswitched method of routing, which leads messages straight to their
destination. Instead, he adopted an “open-highway model” of routing, in
which computers at each site would locally route messages that they
received by reading the digital addresses on each packet.41 It is this packetswitching method that defines the modern-day internet.42 AT&T’s
engineers scoffed at the idea of packet switching when Paul Baran
suggested it to them in 1964.43 Baran remembers an engineer telling him
“Son, this is how a telephone works,” with heavy-handed patience.44
AT&T wanted no part of the ARPA project and remained completely
committed to circuit switching well into the 1980s.45 Indeed, offered the
chance to take over the ARPANET in the 1970s, AT&T formed a
committee, studied the idea for months, and concluded (in Larry Robert’s
words) “that the packet technology was incompatible with the AT&T
network.”46
Exponential growth in internet use initially happened in the United
States because the telephone companies were required by common-carriage
regulation to provide flat-rate dial-up access via a host of internet service
39

Id. at 289. See Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L.
(forthcoming 2007) for a description of this demonstration.
40
TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB, 51 (2000).
41
Barry Leiner, et al., A Brief History of the Internet, 40:2 Communications of the
ACM 102-08 (Feb. 1997), available at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.
42
See RFC 791 (Internet Protocol), http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc791.txt.
43
WALDROP, THE DREAM MACHINE, supra note __, at 277.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 425. See also KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP
LATE 52 (1996).
46
WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 232.
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providers (ISPs) – and ISPs were exempt from access charges.47 Those
ISPs in turn made arrangements with backbone providers (also controlled
by the telephone companies) who interconnect by means of “transit” and
“peering” relationships with other network providers. People used modems
to transmit digital data across ordinary analog copper voice lines at rates of
(in the early days) 28.8 kilobytes per second (Kbps).48
Without the
authority to extract consumer surplus through charging for particular uses of
their telephone networks, the telephone companies were relegated to the
role of commodity bit-transport providers. And without the need to ask for
permission from network providers to launch new services or connect
humans in new ways, individuals and entrepreneurs went to work and
internet use skyrocketed.
Both cable and telephony companies have become anxious to ensure
that they have the ability to “monetize” their internet access networks by
discriminating in favor of the voice and other applications they provide.49
They do not want to be relegated to commodity transport status, and so they
are fighting back against the internet on a number of fronts.50 First,
broadband DSL and cable modem internet access providers succeeded
during 2005 in persuading the FCC (and the Supreme Court) that broadband
access is not a Title II service subject to nondiscrimination and tariffing
rules.51 Second, network providers have been working for the past eight
47

47 U.S.C. § 201(a). Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet,
FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 31 (July 1999) [hereinafter
Unregulation],
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
48
As Kevin Werbach, Jason Oxman, and many other scholars have pointed out,
attachment of modems to telephone networks was only possible because of FCC insistence
that the network providers permit them. Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer
Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2005) [hereinafter Federal Computer Commission]
(describing key role of Part 68 regulation); Jason Oxman, Unregulation, supra note__;
Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice, supra note __, at 84 (“The consumer Internet could not
have happened if users didn't have the ability to attach devices to their telephone lines that
transformed the phone network into a channel for data communications.”).
49
See infra Section __.
50
See, e.g., John G. Waclawsky, Where Do System Standards Go From Here,
BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, Mar. 2005, at 40 [hereinafter System Standards]
(“Commoditization is the biggest fear haunting both telcos and equipment vendors.”).
51
See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125
S. Ct. 2688 (2005) aff'g Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable
and Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00185 & CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
FCC Rcd 4798 (2002); see also Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
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years on standards that will enable them to preserve controls “over user
signaling and usage-based billing, [and] also generate new revenue via deep
packet inspection” of the packets passing through their routers.52 Work on
these standards is proceeding slowly, and so the telcos have lobbied for
protective laws that would allow other proprietary forms of deep-packet
inspection to be put in place for internet access that, in general, would
protect their plans to offer broadband services that are not the “internet” as
either engineers or social historians of the internet would describe it.53
This is standard incumbent behavior. As Paul Starr has noted,
incumbents that dominate networks often try to stay ahead by exploiting
their existing position rather than by innovating or adapting.54
Telecommunications incumbents, in particular, tend to spend little money
on research and development and instead “invest more in politics than in
technology—indeed, they are downright frightened by innovation, whose
ultimate effects they can’t control.”55 Indeed, the goal of these industries is
Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 05-150, 2005 WL 2347773 (rel. Sep. 23, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A1.doc (reclassifying DSL
from a common carrier provided telecommunications service to a largely unregulated
information service). In March 2006, a Verizon petition requesting that high-capacity
business broadband services be exempt from Title II common carriage regulations was
granted through inaction on the part of the FCC. News Release, Verizon Telephone
Companies’ Petition for Forbearance from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with
Respect to their Broadband Services is Granted by Operation of Law, WC Docket No. 04440 (Mar. 20, 2006).
52
John G. Waclawsky, IMS 101: What You Need to Know, BUSINESS
COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, June 2005, at 18 [hereinafter IMS 101]. IMS stands for “IP (or
Internet) Multimedia Subsystem.” Id.
53
E.g.,
draft
Barton-Dingell
bill
(Sept.
2005),
available
at
http://scrawford.net/courses/Draft_Barton-Dingell.pdf (defining “broadband internet
transmission services” and providing that there will be no nondiscrimination requirements
in the context special service plans, video services, protection of providers’ networks, and
the need to provide quality of service guarantees). See also Susan P. Crawford, Internet
Think, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. (forthcoming 2007) (describing mindsets of
engineers, telcos, and netizens); Susan P. Crawford, The Day the Internet Became Cable
Television: Dec. 29, 2009, (Dec. 29, 2006, 11:49 EST) (describing “AT&T Yahoo!
Highspeed Internet U-Verse Enabled” service exempt from neutrality requirements),
available at http://scrawford.blogware.com/blog/_archives/2006/ 12/29/2604993.html.
54
PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA 193 (2005). As Doug Melamed has
pointed out, participants in network industries have greater incentives to carry out
predatory strategies that raise entry barriers. See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries
and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 149-52 (1999).
55
Wade Roush, Net Neutrality: Lessons from the Past, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
(Aug.
3,
2006),
available
at
http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?ch=specialsections&sc=social&id=17
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to reinstantiate the connection between infrastructure and the sharplydelimited “services” they provide, even as these “services” move into an
online environment in which “services” are arbitrary distinctions between
bits.56
C. The Scholars Respond at the Application Layer
These incumbent activities have not gone unnoticed by the academy.
Since 1999, many key law review articles and several books (including
Larry Lessig’s CODE and FUTURE OF IDEAS,57 and Yochai Benkler’s THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS) have explored the incumbent access providerinternet conflict. Internet scholars have been quick to reveal the
monopolistic tendencies of the carriers and have pointed out that the
internet’s entrepreneurial energy is greatly facilitated by the end-to-end
principle.58 Mark Lemley and Larry Lessig have noted that the end-to-end
principle was central to the internet’s success because “e2e expands the
competitive horizon, by enabling a wider variety of applications to connect
and use the network.”59 Tim Wu has argued that internet “Openists”
embrace the end-to-end principle because it “puts as many players in the
contest as possible to ensure the true champion emerges.”60 Kevin Werbach
has pointed out that the end-to-end principle allows a “new service [to] be
deployed simply by connecting two client devices capable of talking to one
another, without requiring any approval or technical configuration inside
the network.”61 All of these writers have strenuously argued that innovation
245) See also John Waclawsky, System Standards, supra note ___, at 41 (“The truth is that
the incumbents are struggling to maintain their legacy, monopoly-based telephony business
model, while they reinvent themselves as wireless, data and TV services providers under
the umbrella of monopoly protection. It’s obvious: They want to own it all!”).
56
See infra note __ (concerning “quadruple play” bundles).
57
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 46-48, 155-76, 246-49
(2001).
58
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. (1999);
Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 34-35 (2001); Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, End of End-to-End, supra note
__, at 970.
59
Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, End of End-to-End, supra note __, at 970; David
P. Reed, Jerome H. Saltzer & and David D. Clark, Comment on Active Networking and
End-to-End Arguments, IEEE NETWORK 12, 3, May/June 1998, at 69-71.
60
Tim Wu, User’s Guide, supra note __.
61
Kevin Werbach, Layered, supra note __.
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at the application layer will be facilitated by continuing to support the endto-end principle.
This focus on the end-to-end principle has led to discussions of
tailoring internet regulation to the various layers of the internet protocol
stack – so that, for example, transport (arguably insufficiently competitive
and requiring continued common-carriage treatment) could be treated
differently from applications (arguably wildly competitive) by regulators.62
A central paper prepared by Richard Whitt in 2003-04 advocated regulatory
intervention at the physical layer.63 Whitt’s paper provides a useful
distillation of the application-layer perspective. He points out that the silo
approach of regulation does not map to what is going on online, and that the
resulting clash is creating regulatory gridlock.64 He states that “By tracking
the architectural model of the Internet--with IP at the center--we can
develop a powerful analytical tool providing granular market analysis
within each layer, which in turn puts public policy on a more sure empirical
footing.”65 He approvingly recites the history of the development of the
TCP/IP protocol, and notes that “The resulting explosion of innovative
applications on the Internet likely would never have happened but for the
incorporation of the end-to-end design into the network.”66
62

Douglas Sicker, now an assistant professor in computer science and
telecommunications at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has noted that he originated
the discussion of layered approaches to policy in an unpublished paper written in 1999 with
Joshua Mindel and Cameron Cooper when Sicker was at the FCC. Douglas C. Sicker &
Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s), 4 J. TELECOMM & HIGH TECH.
L. 299 (2006), citing Douglas C. Sicker, et al., The Internet Connection Conundrum
(unpublished FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper, 1999). Sicker’s “goal was
to move toward technical neutrality and therefore, consistent treatment. This could be
achieved through regulation based on the service, rather than of the network infrastructure
that carries the service. An additional objective was to define a model where the
application layer could continue to innovate by avoiding unintentional regulation.” Sicker’s
unpublished paper appears to have been the original application-layer academic’s
perspective. Many more academics have followed in his footsteps. See supra note ___.
Arguably, the Commission started off the entire layer-regulatory discussion by treating
“telecommunications services” and “information services” differently in the Computer
Inquiries and later in the 1996 Act. Richard S. Whitt, Horizontal Leap, supra note ___, at
600..
63
Richard S. Whitt, Horizontal Leap, supra note __, at 592 ("the [MCI] Network
Layers Model targets the lower network layers for discrete regulation based on the
existence of significant market power, rather than legacy service or industry labels. This
framework concomitantly fosters maximum innovation by leaving otherwise competitive
content and applications markets unfettered by regulation.").
64
Id. at 590-91.
65
Id. at 591.
66
Id. at 606.
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Whitt’s fundamental claim is that the applications (and “content”)
marketplaces are competitive and can be left unregulated.67 He was
unquestionably right, and his seminal paper (along with work by Werbach
and Wu and others) was cited and discussed widely.68 But the economic
and cultural justifications that he provided for the “layers” approach were
limited to two: (1) the explosive innovation that competition among
applications would produce and (2) the mapping between the “actual”
architecture of the internet and the regulatory approach to be taken to it.69
Both of these justifications have proven to be easy targets for anti-openness
and anti-neutrality advocates, and may not reflect the true human value of
the internet’s architecture.
D. The Incumbents Adopt the Scholars’ Layered Approach
The scholars’ particular version of a layered approach to internet
regulation has been co-opted by the carriers, who have been quick to depict
their industry detractors as well-funded providers of “services” that freeride on the carriers’ networks. One man’s explosive innovation is another
man’s missed opportunity, and the incumbent network providers have
complained that it is unfair for rich companies like Google (and, implicitly,
less-rich providers of applications) to be riding on their pipes providing
“services” without paying. Indeed, they have transformed the argument that
competition among applications will lead to innovation into one about
fairness and equity: if they have done all the work to invest in their
networks, why should others be allowed to take advantage of this
67

Id.
A group called the New Millennium Research Council sponsored an entire
collection of essays criticizing Whitt’s paper. Wayne T. Brough, et al., Free Ride:
Deficiencies of the MCI 'Layers' Policy Model and the Need For Principles that Encourage
Competition in the New IP World (New Millennium Research Council Paper, July 2004),
available at http:// newmillenniumresearch.org/news/071304_report.pdf. Other layered
approaches include Douglas C. Sicker and Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered
Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002) and
Tim Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163 (1999).
69
Horizontal Leap, supra note ___. Many other writers have made this same
applications “innovation” argument. See, e.g., PATRICIA L. BELLIA, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN
& DAVID G. POST, CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 19 (3d Ed. 2006) (“End-to-end design has profound implications for the
Internet’s growth and utlization. It grants the maximum possible autonomy to applications
running ‘on top’ of the basic network protocols themselves, giving application-writers the
freedom to achieve their goals in whatever manner they see fit, and to innovate whenever
and however they like. . .. . Innovation comes in the form of new applications...”).
68
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investment without ensuring the network owner some share of their
revenues? In the words of Ivan Seidenberg, CEO of Verizon, the Bells
“have to make sure that [application providers] don’t sit on our network and
chew up bandwidth. We need to pay for the pipe.”70 Similarly, Verizon
deputy general counsel John Thorne has said that Google is “enjoying a free
lunch that should, by any rational account, be the lunch of the facilities
providers.71
Network neutrality72 supporters and detractors are both using the
same application-layer perspective. For example, Tim Wu (a well-known
supporter of neutrality) makes the point that “the attractiveness of
broadband service is a function of the applications it offers the consumer.”73
In two recent articles, he has presented his view that the goal of regulation
of internet access should be to promote the availability of the best products
or applications for end-user use.74 His assumptions along these lines –
internet as content-delivery mechanism – are strikingly similar to those of
Christopher Yoo (a well-known opponent of neutrality), who has focused
on facilitating the development of vertically integrated networks.75
Negative effects of network neutrality, for Yoo, would include
narrowing of “consumer choice” and disfavoring applications that require
quality of service guarantees.76 Yoo sees broadband access providers as the
“retail” stage in a chain of distribution – taking “content” manufactured by
companies and getting it to consumers.77 He suggests that a vertical chain
70

Paul Kapustka, Verizon Says Google, Microsoft Should Pay for Internet Apps, INFO.
WEEK, Jan. 5, 2006. See also Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a
Battle Over Internet Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006 (slightly different version of
Seidenberg remarks).
71
Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google’s “Free Lunch,”
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006.
72
“Network neutrality,” a term coined by Tim Wu (see Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. (2003), generally means
nondiscrimination by network providers against (or in favor of) the transport of particular
packets. See infra Section ___.
73
Broadband Discrimination, supra note ___, at 154.
74
Broadband Discrimination, supra note __; User’s Guide, supra note __.
75
Beyond, supra note ___, at 34. (“standardization on protocols is an equilibrium only
if the utility created by network economic effects exceeds the utility created by network
diversity for both groups.")
76
Id.
77
Yoo’s devotion to the “chain of production” model runs through Beyond, supra note
___. His suggestion is that when products are differentiated, consumers can “obtain goods
that fit better with their ideal preferences.” Standardization (as with the TCP/IP protocol
suite) cuts against differentiation, and may cause consumer welfare loss. His idea is that a
differentiated firm can create new equilibria if it is allowed to compete by “tailoring its
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of production will only be “efficient if every link is competitive.”78 Yoo’s
underlying assumption is that the internet is like a newspaper or a magazine
over which centralized publishers should have control -- he says that “The
fact that telecommunications networks now serve as the conduit for mass
communications and not just person-to-person communications greatly
expands the justification for allowing them to exercise editorial control over
the information they convey.”79 Common carriage precedents, therefore, are
in Yoo’s view completely inapposite – he thinks the internet is “conveying
media content.”80 Yoo’s fundamental assumption is that end-users of the
internet are purchasing a product from the end of a chain of distribution.81
Both Tim Wu, with his narrow focus on application innovation, and
Christopher Yoo, with his absorption with the perquisites of network
managers and the management of supply chains,82 largely ignore human
communications. Both of them could be writing about train networks into
which it is possible to introduce new models of cars. For Wu, cutting off
innovation in car design would be a negative economic step; for Yoo,
allowing track or bridge owners to vertically integrate and control the
design of cars would be a positive move that would deliver customers safely
to their doorsteps. Or these writers could be discussing broadcast networks
on which it is possible to introduce new shows without the permission of
the network owner. Wu, again, would want Darwinian competition among
new shows to flourish, while Yoo would want the network providers to be
able to control content so as to encourage competition among networks.
Yoo and Wu take different approaches to the regulation of internet
access. Yoo claims that there is “congestion” that will only be resolved by
lifting all regulatory requirements from potentially competing network
network towards services that a subsegment of the market values particularly highly.” Id.
at 29. The result is “an equilibrium in which multiple players co-exist despite the presence
of unexhausted economies of scale.” Id. at 30. Yoo believes that allowing the use of
nonstandard protocols and exclusive deals would facilitate competition in the last mile.
78
Id. at 15.
79
Id. at 46, 48.
80
In his words, “[w]hen content is involved, policymakers have long recognized the
importance of giving the conduit editorial control over the information being conveyed.”
Id. at 45, citing Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast
and Wireless “Carriage”, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1997) (tracing the origins of the
regulatory distinction between broadcasting and common carriage).
81
Id. at 38. Yoo suggests that these end-users, like purchasers of any product, should
expect “periodic changes in terms under which they are able to obtain access to the
network.” Id.
82
Beyond, supra note __, and Economics of Congestion, supra note __.
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providers, while Wu wants a non-discrimination rule to be put in place that
would allow discrimination between different “services” but would not
allow discrimination between providers of the same “service”.83 Both of
them, however, see the human communications layer of the internet as
merely substituting for old models of communications products that were
necessarily intertwined with their infrastructures – providing “content
delivery” and other “services.”
The application-layer perspective has troubling implications. The
assumption that online activities can be neatly categorized into simplydefined “services” leads easily (given the network providers’ claims that it
is unfair to let applications from other providers “ride on their pipes”) to a
world that reposes great discretion in the incumbent network providers and
allows them to discriminate against uses that they dislike for their own
business reasons – including P2P, BitTorrent, and other new forms of
distributed file sharing as well as yet-to-be invented forms of interactions.84
Arguments that application-layer competition is the chief social good to be
achieved by network neutrality thus can easily be morphed into arguments
that support the network providers’ worldview.
Also helpful to the network providers is the faith of some scholars in
the original, almost-religiously-important initial architecture of the internet,
and the appropriate neatness of mapping regulation to its structure. On this
83

See Tim Wu, Why Have A Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) (suggesting that “the
discrimination undertaken must be related to the content in question, and not the source of
the information. For example, an internet carrier might decide to speed up the delivery of
all video packets on the network, a difference in treatment driven by the differences in the
underlying information type. But what the carrier may not do under this approach is to
choose favorites, to treat similarly situated packets differently.”); see also Posting of Tim
Wu comments to Save the Internet, http://www.savetheinternet.com/=wu, supporting the
language of the recent AT&T/BellSouth merger (“Interestingly, the agreement does not
prevent AT&T from treating different media carried on the Internet differently, so long as
the carrier does not discriminate between who is providing the content. AT&T, under this
agreement, may speed all the Internet video traffic on its network (to compete, for example,
with cable). But it cannot pick and choose whose video traffic to speed up. In short, AT&T
must treat like traffic alike--that is the essence of the agreement. “Like-treatment” is not a
pure ban on bit-discrimination, and the theory behind the “like-treatment” approach merits
discussion. It is, on the one hand, meant to preserve a basic parity and meritocracy as
between competing Internet application and content providers. For example, the video
providers Yahoo-video and YouTube must be accorded like treatment.”), available at
http://www.savetheinternet.com/=wu. This is a clear statement of the application-layer
perspective.
84
For a list of ISPs around the world that constrain BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer
traffic around the world, see http://www.azureuswiki.com/index.php/Bad_ISPs.
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view, we should regulate transport differently from other internet layers
because that is the way the internet has traditionally worked.
The architecture of the internet could always change; there is an isought fallacy, as Lessig has noted, in assuming that its pure state will stay in
place.85 For this reason, claims that regulation should be mapped to this
structure are easy to knock down. Academic supporters of the network
providers’ views have pointed out that unchanging internet network
architecture, if frozen into place, may discriminate against network
providers’ applications in the future.86 Past internet visionaries have argued
that the internet is broken and that we must start again.87 It is true that the
explosive growth of the internet can be attributed to the way it now works,
but there need to be better reasons for a particular form of regulation of the
internet than merely the existing internet’s past success.
Most centrally, however, the application-layer perspective misses
what is most important about online communications: complex human
relationships.
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW
At the moment, federal telecommunications policy seems to have no
coherent set of goals. We have complex, separate, and wildly out of date
regulatory structures covering telephony, broadcasting, cable television and
satellites.88 Although there is arguably no express delegation by Congress to
the FCC to regulate the internet,89 the FCC sometimes imposes heavyhanded rules (E911 and CALEA for VoIP)90 and sometimes claims that its
85

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
See, e.g., Adam D. Thierer, Net Neutrality: Digital Discrimination or Regulatory
Gamesmanship in Cyberspace, 507 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (2004), available at
http:// www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa507.pdf (advocating for vertical integration). Beyond,
supra note __, at 1 (advocating for vertical integration; claiming that TCP/IP “is poorly
suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in throughput rates, such as
streaming media and VoIP.”).
87
Robert Kahn, co-inventor of TCP/IP, has argued against net neutrality. Andrew
Orlowski, Father of Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, THE REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007.
David Talbot, The Internet Is Broken, MIT TECH. REV., Dec. 19, 2005 (interview with
Dave Clark, “Internet elder statesman and onetime chief protocol architect”).
88
See, e.g., Horizontal Leap, supra note __; Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information
Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 1, 4-5 (2002).
89
See James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004); Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition
in the Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2005).
90
Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, and the Internet 21 BERKELEY
86
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chief goal is to be deregulatory.91 The various policy aims identified by
FCC-watchers are sometimes in conflict.92 Congress spasmodically takes
up indecent speech, gambling, spam, spyware, and privacy, among other
online topics – without, it seems, an underlying theory that would help
prioritize or rationalize internet regulation. Even without a clear goal, these
regulatory actions affect outcomes and create controversies about which
economic and social benefits should be preferred or can be attained. We are
stumbling forward, tinkering blindly with the greatest value-creation system
we have ever seen.
An accurate description of the reality of the internet is generally
absent from current communications law theory. The application-layer
perspective I have described in Part I does not capture what is valuable
about the internet to humans. As users of the internet, we know that the
internet’s transformative effect on economic and cultural life in this country
cannot fully be explained by competition among different applications. If
we adopt a changed perspective on the internet that takes as central the
evolution of human connections and relationships online, economic growth
theory can assist in explaining the impact of the internet and can help us
create an optimal regulatory structure for the future.
A. Economic Growth Theory
Traditional economics assumes implicitly that the economy as a
whole is a closed system that will eventually reach equilibrium. It
predefines the configuration space by assuming perfect competition,
constant returns, and rational behavior. On this view, the most efficient
allocation of resources is the best (“optimal”) one because it will maximize
overall wealth for society. Markets can regulate themselves, led by an
TECH. L.J. 873 (2006).
91
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 05-150, 2005 WL 2347773 (rel. Sep. 23, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A1.doc (reclassifying DSL
from a common carrier provided telecommunications service to a largely unregulated
information service).
92
See, e.g., John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of
Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Ground Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 95 (2002) (identifying five policy aims: (1) limiting market power; (2) protect
consumers from abusive practices; (3) promote a multiplicity of speakers; (4) universal
service; (5) miscellaneous societal objectives (like wiretap capability, 911 service,
disabilities access).
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“invisible hand” to price commodities at their natural price. “[W]hatever
may be the obstacles which hinder [the prices of all commodities] in settling
in this center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending
towards it.”93 (This is a description of negative, thermostat-like feedback,
dampening attempts of any one manufacturer to raise his prices above the
“natural” level.)94 Given increasing population growth and limited
resources of land, labor, and capital, mankind will always be running up
against limits.95 These diminishing returns ensure that firms cannot grow
excessively large, which permits the invisible hand to do its work in a
competitive marketplace. Accordingly, the steady state is the optimal goal
– just sufficient to survive efficiently in an environment of scarcity and
diminishing returns.96
To cope with the arrival of monopoly industries charging prices
above the “natural” price, economists invented the idea of “externalities,” or
“spillovers” that benefit (or harm) others without money changing hands.97
These externalities would, somehow, loosen the control of monopolists –
their competitors would find out their secrets, or come up with neighboring
ideas, because ideas were seen as completely nonexcludable – and all would
sink towards equilibrium and perfect competition again. On the view of an
equilibrium economist, ideas are exogenous. To cope with the arrival of
depressions, neoclassical economists invented the idea that markets could
not always be counted on to operate perfectly and might need stimulation
by government, creating artificial demand or supply to smooth out business

93

KNOWLEDGE, supra note __, at 44.
See description of “feedback” at n.__, infra.
95
“In the classical model of Malthus and Ricardo, growth is constrained by an inelastic
supply of natural resources.” Vernon W. Ruttan, Can Economic Growth Be Sustained? A
Post-Malthusian Perspective, 28 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 1 (Mar. 2002).
96
In perhaps the clearest expression of this competition-obsessed view of economic
growth, Robert Solow asserted in 1956 that “changes in the savings rate have no lasting
effect on the rate of growth of output per worker.” Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and
New Developments in the Theory of Growth, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 3098 (1989), citing Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 70, 94 (1956). Solow’s work
implied that private firms and other actors simply did not devote resources to research and
development and that, even if they did, economics would be unchanged if these actors had
incentives to do so. Id.
97
Frischmann and Lemley note that the term “externalities” has been a “contested
concept in economics for many years.” Brett Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers,
supra note __, at 267. They define externalities as “benefits (costs) realized by one person
as a result of another person's activity without payment (compensation).” Id.
94
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cycle disruptions and move towards a steady state.98 They developed
abstractions and mathematical demonstrations to fill out their assertion that
innovation by (or investments by) autonomous economic agents did not
really matter.
Economists have noticed for a long time that the rate of economic
growth has been accelerating in industrial nations, not slowing down as the
law of diminishing returns might predict.99 Robert Solow’s breakthrough
work fifty years ago showed that “technological progress” allows
economies to add to their outputs without the addition of more labor and
capital.100 But Solow called this key technological-change element
responsible for eighty percent or more of economic growth the “residual,”
and dealt with it as an unexplained exogenous influence.101
Beginning in the mid-1980s Paul Romer seized the challenge of
transforming the “residual” of technological change into an endogenous
element of his model explaining economic growth.102 Since then, Romer
has pointed out in a series of papers that (1) nonrival but (2) partially
excludable ideas can prompt increasing returns when they are (3) exploited
on a large scale.103 We are beginning to understand that the growth in
social wealth per capita in terms of real income per person over the last
millennia is deeply related to the increase in the diversity of new ideas that
has occurred over the same time.104
98

David Warsh tells the story of John Maynard Keynes’s impact in KNOWLEDGE AND
88-89.
99
Americans today are many times richer than they were in 1900. J. Bradford
DeLong, Cornucopia: The Pace of Economic Growth in the Twentieth Century, NBER
Working
Paper
No.
W7602
(2000),
available
at
http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/2000/TCEH_2.html [hereinafter Cornucopia].
100
Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, REVIEW
OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 39 (1957).
101
KNOWLEDGE, supra note __, at 146.
102
Id.
103
See Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, NBER Working Paper 3210
(1990), at 1 (“Technological change. . . lies at the heart of economic
growth...Technological change provides the incentive for continued capital accumulation,
and together, capital accumulation and technological change account for much of the
increase in output per hour worked.”).
104
Paul Romer, Why, Indeed, in America?: Theory, History, and the Origins of
Modern Economic Growth, NBER Working Paper 5443 (1996); ERIC D. BEINHOCKER,
THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF
ECONOMICS 215 (2006). This makes sense in a deep way: in the beginning the universe
was simple, and now it is vastly complex and full of novel structures. STUART KAUFMANN,
INVESTIGATIONS 143 (2000) (“The diversity of species in the biosphere has increased over
the last 4.8 billion years, while the diversity of ways of making a living has increased over
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
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1. Nonrival ideas
Economic growth happens whenever people are able to take
resources or inputs and arrange them in ways that are more valuable. New
ways of doing things are, in a sense, new “recipes” for these arrangements.
In the words of Paul Romer, “Economic growth arises from the discovery of
new recipes [ideas] and the transformation of things from low to high-value
configurations.”105 In the last 200 years or so, technological progress and
concomitant economic growth have been particularly dramatic.106 Romer
and others suggest that this may be happening because more people and
more (and better) institutions are out looking for new ideas and new
technologies.107 The freedom to look for these ideas is fundamental to
economic growth.108 Bad ideas really do lead to good ideas, in that the
diversity of ideas as a whole allows exploration to discover what is
useful.109 Ideas, or the stock of knowledge, can grow without bound on a
the past 3 million years.”); cf Joseph Schumpeter, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY chap. 7 (1975) (orig. pub. 1942) (listing mechanisms that trigger economic
growth). Some have criticized new growth theory for being nothing more than a market
imperfections theory of technological change. See Ben Fine, Endogenous Growth Theory:
A Critical Assessment, 24 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 245, 249 (2000) (“This is
a simple result of the externalities or socially increasing returns to scale involved.
Generally, it follows that the competitive outcome induces a level of saving that is below
the optimum, since private agents take no account of the knock-on effects of corresponding
levels of investment. Once there is an endogenous growth mechanism in place, however,
attention can focus on any market imperfection that affects the saving rate and, hence,
long-run prospects.”)
105
Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, NBER Working Paper 3210
(1990).
106
Cornucopia, supra note 109.
107
Ronald Bailey, Post-Scarcity Prophet: Economist Paul Romer on Growth,
Technological Change, and an Unlimited Human Future, reason.com, Dec. 2001,
available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/28243.html).
108
Id. Economic growth theory was inspired, in part, by Joseph A. Schumpeter’s
insistence that “creative destruction” is “[t]he fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the
capitalist engine in motion.” Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Process of Creative Destruction,
in CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (New York: Harper, 1975) (orig. pub. 1942),
at 82-85. See also CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (2001).
109
“To speed up growth, it is not enough to increase spending on research and
development. Instead, an economy must increase the total quantity of inputs that go into
the process of research and development.” Paul Romer, Should the Government Subsidize
Supply or Demand in the Market for Scientists and Engineers? NBER Working Paper 7723
(2000) [hereinafter Government Subsidize], at 14. The “diversity” argued for in this Article
is different from the FCC’s version of “diversity.” See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review,
133 FCC Rcd. 11,276 para 4 (1998) (“[F]or more than a half century, the Commission’s
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per-person basis, and can prompt a better quality of life for everyone.
Thus, economic growth comes from better recipes – better new ideas
for dealing with finite resources. New ideas are “nonrival” in that they can
be used by anyone without diminishing their value. And new nonrival ideas
that lead to goods and services being introduced on a broad scale trigger
increasing returns (lower costs, higher profits based on the use of finite
resources) and push economies onward.110 In Paul Romer’s words, “it is
ideas, not objects, that poor countries lack.”111
2. Specialization and Scale
The United States experienced explosive economic growth in the
19th century because it had abundant resources, a national transportation
system, and a large population.112 Market size increases incentives for
invention by supporting the provision of many specialized inputs, and cheap
transportation helps inventors make their new ideas available. With
technological convergence pushing towards use of standard machines to
regulation of broadcast service has been guided by the goals of promoting competition and
diversity.”); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), citing Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“[B]ecause of the scarcity of
[electromagnetic frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.”) The kind of
diversity suggested in this Article is not affirmative content-based diversity – “the fostering
of programming that reflects minority viewpoints or appeals to minority tastes.” Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting as
unconstitutional FCC equal employment opportunity regulations because not serving a
“compelling” interest and therefore not capable of surviving strict scrutiny review).
Rather, the diversity encouraged by this Article is the difference that comes from ensuring
that people with diverse experiences, training, perspectives, predictive models,
interpretations, and tools are online. This kind of diversity – cognitive diversity -- can be
facilitated by simply ensuring that the most people possible have internet access. See infra
Section ___. For a fascinating exploration of diversity, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE
DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS,
AND SOCIETIES 13 (2006) (“Diverse perspectives and tools enable collections of people to
find more and better solutions and contribute to overall productivity.”).
110
In Paul Romer’s words, “it is ideas, not objects, that poor countries lack.” Paul
Romer, Economic Growth, from The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, David R.
Henderson, ed. (2007). Much of the value to society of any given new idea is not captured
by its individual inventor. Lemley & Frischmann, Spillovers; Romer Endogenous
Technogical Growth, at 22.
111
Paul Romer, Economic Growth, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
(David R. Henderson, ed. 2007) [hereinafter Economic Growth]. Much of the value to
society of any given new idea is not captured by its individual inventor. Spillovers, supra
note 5; ENDOGENOUS, supra note 6, at 22.
112
KNOWLEDGE, supra note __, at 37.
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produce many kinds of goods, an integrated market, and a large group of
people to sell to, the U.S. took the technological lead over the rest of the
world, and held it through much of the twentieth century.113 Technological
change and new ideas introduced in the U.S. caused this country to surge
ahead of Britain in terms of economic growth.114
Market size increases incentives for invention by supporting the
provision of many specialized inputs, and cheap transportation helps
inventors make their new ideas available. The new growth theorists put
scale in the foreground as a fundamental aspect of modern economic
understanding, because larger markets induce the creation of more new
ideas and hence faster growth.115 The human communications made
possible by the internet have the greatest scale of any communications
modality we have known thus far.
3. The U.S. and Economic Growth
Nations have different economic growth rates. From 1950 to 2000,
growth in income per person in the U.S. was about 2.3% per year, but the
growth rate in China was almost six percent per year – meaning that income
per capita in China was doubling every 12 years.116 India, meanwhile, is
quickly becoming a third pillar of the world economy with China and the
U.S., and its economy has been growing at an average of 5.7% yearly since
1979.117 Some sources predict that India’s economy will continue to grow at
the same rate for the next fifteen years.118 This year, the growth rate in
Europe is estimated to be 2.6%, and the U.S. is said to be experiencing a
“soft landing” in 2007 – less economic growth.119 No nation remains truly
113

Richard Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall of American Technological
Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
LITERATURE, Dec. 1992, at 1931-64.
114
Paul Romer estimates that U.S. income per capita grew at a rate of 1.8% per year
from 1870-1992; in Britain, it grew at a rate of 1.3% per year. Paul Romer, Should the
Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market for Scientists and Engineers?
NBER Working Paper 7723 (2000). Income per capita grew in Sweden at a rate of 3% per
year until 1970, and then the growth rate slowed. Id. at 11-12.
115
Endogenous, supra note __, at 2.
116
Economic Growth, supra note ___.
117
Economywatch.com,
India
Economy
Overview,
available
at
http://www.economywatch.com/indianeconomy/indian-economy-overview.html.
118
Foresight2020 report, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Mar. 2006, available at
http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=eiu_Cisco_Foresight_2020.
119
Morgan Stanley, Global Economic Forum: Re-rating Euroland, Nov. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/.
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innovative for very long, and the torch of technological process and
economic growth may have been passed to Asia.
The average rate of economic growth (growth in value, not growth
in the number of objects or people) is extremely important for an economy,
and encouraging income to increase more quickly in a shorter amount of
time is the central economic policy task of any nation. If the rate of
economic growth in the U.S. over the next forty-five years or so were to
increase by 0.5% per year, it could “resolve all of the budget difficulties
associated with the aging of the Baby Boom generation, and still leave
ample resources for dealing with any number of other pressing social
problems.”120 Better growth policy could have implications for the standard
of living of all Americans that are so enormous that they are hard to
understand.
The problem for the U.S. is that it will not be able to stay ahead in
terms of its economic growth rate by importing ideas from elsewhere –
given its technological history, the U.S. is still a place from which new
ideas come. (Until recently, by contrast, India’s and China’s economic
growth stemmed from simply opening themselves up to new ideas from
other countries.)121 This means that the U.S. must strongly support
discovering new ideas within its own borders. Paul Romer’s work, in
particular, supports investments in infrastructure that is likely to produce
new ideas: graduate education, research subsidies, and engagement with
other economies.122 As a country, we are in urgent need of meta-ideas
about the generation of new ideas.123
B. Growth Theory and the Internet
Thus, in recent years, traditional economics has had to open its
120

Government Subsidize, supra note __, at 11-12.
Economic Growth, supra note ___.
122
Government Subsidize, supra note __; The Growth of Growth Theory, ECONOMIST,
May 18. 2006. See also Thomas L. Friedman, Learning to Keep Learning, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2006 (supporting report “titled ‘Tough Choices or Tough Times,’ which proposes
a radical overhaul of the U.S. education system, with one goal in mind: producing more
workers -- from the U.P.S. driver to the software engineer -- who can think creatively.”)
123
“[I]n the advanced countries of the world, progress in macroeconomic stabilization
policy has reduced the threat of a paralyzing economic collapse and even reduced the
frequency of mild recessions. In this environment, the lure of better growth policy is
compelling. If an economy can increase its trend rate of growth by even a small amount,
the cumulative effect on standards of living is too big to ignore.” Government Subsidize,
supra note ___, at 4..
121
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doors to work that rigorously examines the sources of increased
productivity and focuses on the centrality of new ideas to economic
growth.124 This research has transformed economics from a “dismal
science” preoccupied with the scarcity of land, labor, and capital (and
concerned about the diminishing returns these resources will generate as
markets perfect themselves) into a field that spends much of its time
focusing on abundance, increasing returns, and the power of new ideas.
The work of growth theorists reveals that choices made by
government to stimulate the production of new ideas can have an significant
effect on economic growth.125 Compared to a country with restraints on
idea-generation diversity, a country supporting free trade in ideas should
tend to have a greater amount of resources devoted to idea-generation and
thus a higher rate of economic growth.126
The internet provides a particularly fertile environment for the
development of these diverse new thoughts that will drive growth. It
supports the development of groups and other forms of online
communication that are potentially highly responsive to the feedback of
human beings and highly likely (given the enormous scale and connectivity
of the internet) to trigger exponential development of unpredictably diverse
new ideas that are nonrivalrous.127 Indeed, the internet makes it possible for
124

Within ten years of the publication of Paul Romer’s 1990 paper, Endogenous
Technological Change, “the number of articles explicitly drawing upon endogenous growth
theory almost certainly border[ed] on a thousand . . . spread over 50 or more economics
journals” and including textbooks, surveys, and special issues. Ben Fine, Endogenous
Growth Theory: A Critical Assessment, Cambridge Journal of Economics 2000, 24, 245265 (2000).
125
Development economists in 1990 came up with the Washington Consensus, which
suggested that “growth was a matter of getting national policies right.” Roberto Zagha,
Gobind Nankani, & Indermit Gill, 43 IMF QUARTERLY MAGAZINE, Mar. 2006.
126
Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and New Developments in the Theory of Growth,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3098 (1989), at 28, 30. This is
undoubtedly a gross simplification of economic growth theory, but Romer’s popularizing
language makes such a simplification and application to pending policy questions
inevitable. Indeed, diversity of new ideas (which leads to diversity of economic goods and
services) does not just generate fodder for selection; the differences provided by diversity
generate further diversity. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note __, at 85. The diversity of the
economy increases consistently because “the more objects there are in the economy, the
more complement and substitute relation exist among those objects, as well as potential
new objects in the adjacent possible....Thus, as the diversity of the objects in the web
increases, the diversity of prospective niches for new goods and services increases even
more rapidly! The very diversity of the economic web is autocatalytic.” INVESTIGATIONS,
supra note __, at 226.
127
“[E]conomic returns to telecommunications infrastructure investment are much
greater than the returns on just the telecommunication investment itself.” Lars-Hendrik
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humans to enter into forms of relationships that were systematically
constrained before 1995: potentially persistent, potentially visible,
asynchronous niche arrangements across great distances that are based on
interest and attention. Emerging from this freedom of human connection are
dynamic forms of human affiliation (groups, teams, collaborations of all
kinds) that create opportunities for exponential growth in value. These
affiliations are a form of self-generated order, and these human online
communications are themselves a complex system (or system of complex
systems).128 The possibility space (“the adjacent possible” in Stuart
Kauffman’s terms)129 for the most diverse developments is being created by
human communications online, and, in particular, in those areas where
collective interactivity is facilitated and can be selected through the
feedback loop of our own attention.
Thus, there is something new about the internet that separates online
communications from all former communications modalities. Traditional
broadcast does not have actors providing feedback who are also providing
the content, and does not make it possible for interesting new species and
new ways to make a living to emerge (without permission from the
broadcast operator). Broadcast does not provide a social “place” – it is not
persistent, and it does not have attributes that allow humans to play roles
Roller & Leonard Waverman, Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic
Development, A Simultaneous Approach (finding “significant positive causal link” between
telecommunications developments and economic growth) at 909-10. These returns are
similar to the tremendous returns to public infrastructure investment such as transportation,
sewer systems, water, electricity, etc. See David Alan Aschauer, Is Public Expenditure
Productive?, JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, March 1989 23(2), 177-200 (finding
return to infrastructure can be as high as seventy percent per year). Aschauer also suggests
a strong relationship between U.S. productivity slowdown and the decline in the growth
rate of public capital stock. Id.
128
“Complex” does not mean “complicated.” Rather, the science of complex adaptive
systems tells us that complex systems feature autonomous agents whose micro-level
interactions result in unpredictable yet persistent patterns of “fit” order – reflecting the
desires of agents and their reactions (“feedback”) to their local environment. M. MITCHELL
WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS
(1992) is a useful introduction to the study of complex systems. See also JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1988); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE:
THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995) [hereinafter
AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE]. In a complex system, the whole is continually greater than
the sum of its parts because agents are able to positively feed back their reactions in light of
the environment of the system. This positive feedback can amplify and nudge a system to
change in system-level, unpredictable ways. AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 23. The science of
complex systems provides us with new tools for understanding and facilitating online
communications, and sheds new light on what people value about the internet.
129
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note __.
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and thus create diverse new ideas of various kinds. Telephony provides oneto-one communications, but no persisting diversity of entities is directly
facilitated by telephony against which some selection algorithm can
operate. The internet can do more than just transport bits and facilitate
momentary person-to-person communications. It can also provide a
substrate that enables new ideas and new forms of social organisms to
emerge, created by many different decisions to pay attention. As David
Reed has made clear, the great value of the internet is not so much that it
connects more people and devices (and allows more applications to
flourish), but that it supports the construction of communicating groups.130
The complexity of online communications is capable of producing
an enormous diversity of human relationships. And investment of our
attention in these collaborative efforts has a greater payoff than investment
of attention in either the one-to-many transactions made possible by
broadcast or the one to one (peer) transactions made possible by
telephony.131 It is true that the complex perspective, taken alone, has little
normative direction and gives us as individual actors little to do. Each of us
can only hope to contribute to increased complexity through our personal
engagement, and we cannot say either that our efforts will make any
predictable difference or that increased complexity will necessarily help the
130

David P. Reed, That Sneaky Exponential – Beyond Metcalfe’s Law to the Power of
Spring
1999,
available
at
Community
Building,
CONTEXT,
http://www.reed.com/Papers/GFN/reedslaw.html (“[Group Forming Networks] create a
new kind of connectivity value that scales exponentially with N [where N = the number of
subscribers]. Briefly, the number of non-trivial subsets that can be formed from a set of N
members is 2N-N-1, which grows as 2N. Thus, a network that supports easy group
communication has a potential number of groups that can form that grows exponentially
with N.”)
131
Id. at 2 (“Once N [the number of subscribers to a network) grows sufficiently large,
GFN (group forming network) transactions create more value per unit of network
investement than do broadcast transactions. So what tends to happen is that as networks
grow, peer transactions out-compete broadcast content in the arena of attention and return
on investment. And remarkably, once N gets sufficiently large, GFN transactions will outcompete both of the other categories.”) This notion is distinguishable from, although
related to, the idea of “peer production” about which Yochai Benkler has written. It is not
so much that complex interactions online are producing particular forms of visible
entertainment or advances in technology but that the complex relationships experienced
online are themselves valuable to humans. Benkler is unquestionably correct that peer
production is replacing former employer-driven modalities of development. But his is
fundamentally an “application-layer” perspective; he asks how the internet enables new
ways of producing particular forms of output. My suggestion is that complex online
relationships and self-generated order are providing innovation in social relationships at a
system level, and that this social innovation is not adequately captured by the “peer
production” idea, as transformative as it has been.
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world in an identifiable way. But economic growth theory, with its
emphasis on new ideas, diversity, and scale producing increasing returns,
combines with our newfound understanding of communications complexity
in a fruitful way. Our national economic policy, which looks for
opportunities for increased economic growth, should be closely tied to
communications policy that facilitates the interactive, group-forming
attributes of the internet.
III. RE-THEORIZING THE CURRENT DEBATE
Many telecom scholars are focused on the economic efficiency (or
not) of a particular legal regime for broadband network management from a
traditional economics, non-systemic point of view. Several fundamentally
view the internet as a broadcast, supply-chain medium. As a result, the
debate over the future of the internet in the telecommunications literature
has been defined in terms of control over content delivery – with skirmishes
over who should be able to charge whom for access to particular pipes
through which this content will be pumped. Reconceiving communications
law to put the internet at the center and to focus on facilitating human
communications themselves will have important implications for U.S.
policy.
A. Telecom Scholars and the Internet
The exceptional nature of online human communications, and their
capacity to foster economic growth, has not been adequately addressed in
the telecommunications literature.
Although Daniel Spulber and
Christopher Yoo have written about complexity theory in assessing network
congestion, their work assumes a closed network managed by a traditional
telephone company.132 Kevin Werbach and Richard Whitt have done
pathbreaking work on understanding the layers of the internet and mapping
regulation to these layers.133 But they generally describe the social layer of
the internet as the “content” layer, without grappling with its complex
nature or its potential for the encouragement of economic growth.134 Joseph
132

Daniel Spulber & Christopher Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex
Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687 (2005).
133
Federal Computer Commission, supra note __; Horizontal Leap, supra note __, at
590-92.
134
Indeed, the very common use of the word “content” signals that there will be
authoritative “content deliverers” as in a static broadcast system; no feedback loops
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Farrell and Philip Weiser have written about the conflict between Chicago
School views of vertical integration and the internet model of modularity.135
James Speta has focused on facilitating intermodal competition for access
networks.136 These contributions, significant as they are, are largely
concerned with how to regulate telecommunications network providers in a
presumably closed equilibrium economic world. No one is focused on the
role of positive human feedback in the communications layer of the
internet, the capacity of the internet’s communications layer to foster
diverse new forms of relationships that can lead to new ideas, or the
importance of new ideas to increasing returns and overall economic growth.
Other scholars take a broader view of online communications but
have trouble assigning any particular value to them. For example, Brett
Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick argue that both innovation and
valuable uses of the internet will be cut off in the absence of a “network
neutrality” mandate but become (understandably) vague when it comes to
comparing those outputs to the benefits to network providers that would
accrue if a neutrality mandate did not exist.137 Frischmann’s independent
study of lakes and roads as infrastructures comes the closest to appreciating
the systemic value of the internet,138 but even he has difficulty asserting that
one approach to internet access regulation will create any greater value than
another.
Online communications are not just like any other form of economic
activity. Ideas are not like goods; they are potentially far more valuable.
The online world enables the creation of new relationships and thus new
ideas that are key to our future economic growth. Communications law can
no longer afford to ignore this central fact and its radical implications for
policy.

implied.
135
Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age,
17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85 (2003) (discussing the pros and cons of internalizing
complementary efficiencies (or “ICE”)).
136
James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1063 (2004).
137
Brett Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Yoo’s Frame and What it Ignores:
Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway (2006)
(manuscript, on file with author).
138
Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
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B. Implications for Policy: Universal Service
The key organizing principle for communications law must be to
support the emergence of diverse new ideas online because that is where
economic growth for society as a whole will come from. This form of
diversity support is not the same as the kind of quota-driven artificial
“diversity” that has been used to force broadcast content regulation to
reflect minority viewpoints.139 Rather, this kind of online diversity stems
from allowing the end-to-end, content-neutral, layer-independent functions
of the internet to flourish and allowing groups and human attention to pick
and choose from among the bad ideas presented online, enabling good ideas
to persist and replicate.
This principle for future communications regulation – encourage
diversity – has immediate practical implications. We have not made access
to the internet’s system of human communications sufficiently universal.
The FCC requires traditional dial-up wireline telecommunications carriers,
wireless carriers (and, now, providers of “interconnected VoIP,” but not
providers of highspeed DSL or cable modem internet access services) to
subsidize high-cost local telephone service and basic “lifeline” telephone
service for a wide variety of people and entities, under the general category
of “universal service.”140 In 2005, universal service cost these companies
and their subscribers $6.5 billion.141 The basic idea behind universal
service is to subsidize the costs of some basic telephony services to serve
particular (and sometimes differing) policy ends.142 Although there are a
139

See supra note ___ (discussing “diversity”). Having the FCC support the diversity
in generation of new ideas that the internet makes possible is akin to the FCC’s role in
radio formats, see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981), in which the
Commission relies on the market to serve the public interest in diversity. See SCOTT E.
PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS,
SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xix (“[D]iverse groups of problem solvers – groups of people
with diverse tools – consistently outperformed groups of the best and the brightest.”)
Diversity trumps ability.
140
See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Killing with Kindness: Fatal Flaws in the $6.5 Billion
Universal Service Funding Mission and What Should Be Done to Narrow the Digital
Divide, 24 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. LAW J. 447 (2006) [hereinafter Killing with
Kindness]; Federal–State Joint Board on Universal Service; IP-Enabled Services, 71 Fed.
Reg 38781, 38782 (July 10, 2006), at 19, para 34 (extending universal service obligations
to “interconnected VoIP”).
141
Id.
142
For a brief outline of universal service history, see STUART MINOR BENJAMIN,
DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, HOWARD SHELANSKI, & PHILIP J. WEISER,
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number of different universal service programs, none is focused on
facilitating highspeed access to the internet per se.143
The universal service program has been widely acknowledged to be
both baffling and broken. The contributions required of carriers (and now
interconnected VoIP providers) are steep, amounting to more than 10% of
long distance revenues.144 The many different programs and crosssubsidies that make up the universal service package may not be helping
the people they were designed to help, while they may be helping other
people that do not need assistance; this may be particularly true of the high
cost subsidies for rural areas, which flow directly to carriers. “Square-state”
rural Senators support universal service subsidies that companies within
their states receive. There are routine allegations of fraud and abuse,
particularly in connection with the school and library program services.
Because the programs assume that basic telephone service is the end goal,
there is no support given for training in the use of the internet.145 The
programs seem designed to freeze a basic-telephony model in place, without
adequately taking account of the ways in which the world of
communications has changed.
Universal access policy should be closely linked with this country’s
general economic policy. The questions of who should pay for universal
service, what services should be subsidized, and how the system should be
reformed have dogged policy discussion for years. Reform is essential, but
principles will likely give way to the desires of the many carriers, vendors,
and Senators who benefit directly and indirectly from the status quo. Given
the importance to economic growth of the facilitation of new ideas via new
technologies, universal access to the internet should be at the center of
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, 763-65 (2d Ed. 2006).
143
The Lifeline program reduces telephony costs for low-income households; Federal
Linkup reduces initial hookup charges for telephone service for low income households;
both the FCC and the states have high-cost fund subsidy programs that support companies
that provide services “in areas where the cost of providing service exceeds a national or
state average by at least 115 to 135%.” Killing with Kindness, supra note, at 459. Except
for schools, libraries, and rural medical facilities, universal service support is not provided
for highspeed internet access.
144
FCC Contribution Factors and Quarterly Filings (2006), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universal_service/quarter.html. Inclusion of software based VoIP
providers is a dramatic step, designed in part to raise barriers to entry for services that
challenge the existing wireline telephony revenue stream for the existing carriers. Killing
with Kindness, supra note ___.
145
Killing with Kindness, supra note __, at 460 notes that the “FCC expressly deems
ineligible for e-rate funding ‘training in the use of the Internet,’ ‘costs for training provided
via the Internet,’ and ‘services that go beyond basic conduit access to the Internet.’”
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communications policy. The more people are online, the more likely it is
that we will find the new ideas that will spur economic growth – just as it is
likely true that the more science and technology graduate students we
support, the more likely that economic growth will be spurred. Traditional
voice telephone services are quickly being taken over by much less
expensive internet services, so it makes little sense to continue funding the
former as a national policy matter. The goal of universal service, after all, is
to make communications technologies available to every citizen, and the
relevant technology at the moment is highspeed access.146 There is a strong
correlation between highspeed internet access penetration (the number of
highspeed subscribers per a set group of inhabitants) and per capita gross
domestic product – the benchmark against which economic growth is
measured.147
Diverse new ideas whose development is made easier by the advent
of the internet and its special characteristics are likely to emerge at a greater
pace once highspeed access is widely available in this country.
Participating in this ecology is becoming more important to the economic
and cultural success of Americans and the overall economic growth of this
country. We should tie universal service programs to the principle that
funding highspeed access to the internet for all should be a top social
priority.148
146

Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction, 17
TELECOMM. POL'Y 352, 356 (1993).
147
See OECD June 2006 chart, OECD Broadband Penetration and GDP per Capita
(showing correlation of 0.62), available at www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband. To carry out
this national priority, the funding mechanism for universal access should be through
general tax revenue rather than the imposition of fees on nascent VoIP services. I am not
the first to suggest a common fund mechanism for universal service. Using general
taxation as a funding mechanism would prompt recognition that providing universal
service is a social good that benefits everyone. In addition, funding universal service
through actual taxation would provide helpful auditing incentives that would keep the fund
in check and clarify its mission. What is new in this Article is the suggestion that the
continued economic growth of this country is likely tied to far-seeing communications
policy, and the notion that we can use the universal service system as a vessel for
articulating and implementing this policy on a nationwide scale. Other countries, including
South Korea and Japan, have taken this approach. See Broadband IT, Korea Vision (2007);
see also http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom_access_wisdom_east;
Takanori Ida,
Broadband, Information Society, and the National System in Japan, in GLOBAL
BROADBAND BATTLES 68-69 (2005)
148
Americans are willing to fund public infrastructure if (1) it has a visible effect and
(2) the money is going directly into funding that visible effect. For the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the visible effect was electricity and an improved quality of life. Tennessee
Valley Authority, From the New Deal to a New Century, available at
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C. Implications for Policy: Network Neutrality
Once we get involved in public funding of highspeed access, we will
need to turn to the social policies that should be embodied in that access.
The highspeed wires in our homes are just transport to the internet. We put
packets of data onto those wires and they get to their global destinations
through the use of IP addresses processed by various network interfaces.
But network providers in this country – the actors who provide this
transport to the internet – would like to ensure that they can “monetize”
these connections by discriminating against particular packets. The
network providers’ desires are deeply troubling. They must think that they
can take this system of complex systems and dumb it down to their own
advantage. This simplifying approach is more than short-sighted; if it is
enacted into law, it is destructive of our economic future.149
1. Discrimination Defined
By “discrimination,” I mean allowing network access providers to
treat some traffic or some users differently. The protocols designed to make
end-to-end universal connectivity work online call for information to be
chunked into standardized packets. Those packets, in turn, are made up of
headers (addressing information) and payload (content). The header
information allows the packets to be separately forwarded by routers along
“best effort” paths (without any guarantee that they will be delivered) and
re-assembled by a destination computer. The header information for each
packet may include information about the sender and recipient (their
address on the network), as well as the length of the packet (which may
reveal something about what kind of application is being used), the port
used by the source and destination computers (which also may reveal
http://www.tva.gov/abouttva/history.htm. A similar, national, strong program may be
needed to fund highspeed internet access in this country. See FCC Commr. Michael Copps,
America’s Internet Disconnect, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006 (“The solution to our broadband
crisis must ultimately involve public-private initiatives like those that built the railroad,
highway and telephone systems. Combined with an overhaul of our universal service
system to make sure it is focusing on the needs of broadband, this represents our best
chance at recapturing our leadership position.”)
149
See generally REED HUNDT, IN CHINA’S SHADOW: THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN
ENTREPRENUERSHIP (2006) (arguing that U.S. needs to reform its legal, technological, and
leadership architecture in order to renew American cultural commitment to
entrepreneurship).
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something about the application being used), and the address of the source
and destination (which may reveal the manufacturer of the device).150 The
payload information will include an indication of what application is being
used and chunks of content.
A non-discriminatory network provider will send each packet on its
way using the header addressing information, without prioritizing any
packet and without inspecting or using the rest of the information in the
header or in the payload of the packet. Packets are treated by their routers
on a first-in, first-out basis. This “best efforts,” non-discriminatory
approach has worked very well so far. Although a telco provider may feel
that the internet is “broken” because it cannot guarantee particular levels of
service, there is excess capacity on the internet and packets, by and large,
are not dropped.151 And even if they were, for most uses and most users a
few dropped packets would not appreciably diminish the internet experience
– and with increasing bandwidth all packets will travel faster through lastmile networks.152
New technologies have emerged that make it possible for network
providers to use this header information as well as information inside
packets (“deep packet inspection”) to selectively prioritize packets and thus
charge different prices for different kinds of information being routed
through their networks. For example, Cisco Systems, one of the world’s
largest manufacturer of routers, is selling services that assist network
providers in deep packet inspection and content-inspection.153 This service
will allow network providers to know what applications (e.g., VoIP) are
150

See generally Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network
Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, TPRC 2006, at 4 [hereinafter Balanced
Policy].
151
J. Prufer & E. Jahn, Dark Clouds over the Internet?, Mimeo, Goethe University of
Frankfurt (2006).
152
Note that no one network provider can control quality of service across multiple
networks unless there is a commitment by all network providers to treat particular packets
in a particular way. There are deep debates over whether “quality of service” guarantees
are worth the expense of installing them. See, e.g., Ben Teitelbaum, Internet2 QoS: Is Less
More?,
Oct.
29,
2001,
available
at
http://people.internet2.edu/~ben/talks/columbiaSeminar-10.01.pdf;
see
also
http://qos.internet2.edu/wg/documents-informational/20020503-premium-problems-nonarchitectural.html.
153
Cisco Systems, Deploying Premium Services Using Cisco Service Control
Technology,
2005,
available
at
www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/products/ps6150/c1031/cdccont_0900aecd802
5258e.pdf, Cisco Systems, Core Elements of the Cisco Self-Defending Network Strategy
(2005 White Paper, at 8).
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being used by end-users, and which end-users are using their routers (e.g.,
an IP address of a competitor). Information gleaned from this service can
then be used in combination with “traffic shaping” commands to dictate, for
example, that packets stemming from particular applications or particular
users always be placed in the back of the queue for forwarding – or dropped
entirely.154 Prioritization can occur through logical and physical routing
techniques that allocate particular types of communications to different
“channels” (some more congested than others).155 Alternatively, network
providers can use their deep-packet-inspection powers to detect
“unauthorized” video and other applications and charge for their use.156
This is the origin of the network neutrality debate in the U.S.: whether
telcos and cablecos should be permitted to charge fees for preferred
handling of internet traffic.157
Network providers have ample reasons to discriminate in this way in
favor of their own applications.158 They are often providers of traditional
telephony services, are trying to introduce their own VoIP services, or
154

See generally Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality (July 6,

2006).

155

Balanced Policy, supra note __, at 6.
Balanced Policy, supra note __, at 9, citing Sandvine, Sandvine Network
Demographic
Management,
available
at
www.sandvine.com/general/getfile.asp?FILEID=15.
157
See, e.g., John G. Waclawsky, IMS: A Critique of the Grand Plan, BUS. COMM.
REV., 54 (Oct. 2005). As Ed Whitacre of AT&T famously said: “Now what [Google,
MSN, Vonage and others] would like to do is use my pipes for free, but I ain’t going to let
them do that because we have spent this capital
and we have to have a return on it. So
there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay
for the portion they’re using.” Online Extra: At SBC, It’s all About “Scale and Scope,”
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/
magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm. See also Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of
Interactive Television Services Over Cable, Comments of The National Cable Television
Association 50 (Mar. 19, 2001) (arguing that mandatory nondiscriminatory access policy is
unconstitutional), available at http://ncta.com/pdf_files/CS_Dock_01-7Comments.PDF.
There are different flavors of neutrality; Tim Wu, for example, appears to believe that
network providers should be permitted to discriminate in favor of particular categories of
applications, such as video. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? AntiDiscrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006).
Wu’s could be categorized as a weak form of network neutrality. The strong form of
network neutrality suggests that network providers should not be allowed to discriminate
against (or in favor of) any packets for other than security-related reasons.
158
See Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network
Neutrality
Regulation,
TPRC
2005,
available
at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/483/van%20Schewick%20Network%20Neutralit
y%20TPRC%202005.pdf.
156
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simply want to ensure that they get a cut in the revenue of any applications
riding on “their” network. As Edward Felten has pointed out, causing delay
for particular applications such as non-provider VoIP applications “could be
an effective tactic for an ISP that wants to drive customers away from
independent Internet telephone services.”159 Even de-prioritization of
packets that does no more than to cause them to experience delay in transit
can have substantial effects on user experience (“jitter”). Using unproritized “services” online could become a miserable pastime if there were
constant delay.
These simple network-discrimination abilities of network providers
are part of a larger approach to extend cellphone standards to the internet
through a grand collection of processes labeled IMS, for IP (or Internet)
Multimedia Subsystem.160 The idea behind this longstanding standardscreation effort (in process since 1998) is to wrap IP packets into a
centralized signalling system that mimics traditional telephony approaches
to networking and allows for fine-grained billing for particular uses of the
network.161 In essence, online communications would be labeled as
particular “services” and would be billed for accordingly. The IMS billing
vision is in turn part of the United Nation’s International
Telecommunication Union’s Next Generation Network (NGN) efforts,
which seek to internationalize and standardize internet governance practices
generally.162
2. Market Concentration
These network discrimination practices and plans would be
irrelevant to our national economic policy if there were ample competition
in the market for broadband access in the U.S. But such competition does
not exist. Although President Bush has made speeches about the
importance of competitive broadband access in the U.S. (declaring that

159

Id.
IMS 101, supra note __.
161
Id. See also Cisco Systems, Cisco Service Control: A Guide to Sustained
Broadband
Profitability,
available
at
www.democraticmedia.org/PDFs/CiscoBroadbandProfit.pdf; System Standards, supra note
__ (IMS-like approaches “slowing grinding out a series of elaborate, mostly stillborn
solutions to the participants’ rather than the end-users’ problems”).
162
See International Telecommunication Union page describing Next Generation
Network standardization efforts, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ngn/index.phtml.
160
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universal access to broadband should be achieved by 2007, for example),163
the marketplace is controlled by regional cable/telco duopolies.164 More
than ninety-eight percent of home broadband users obtain internet access
from either a telephone company’s DSL service or a cable company’s cable
modem service.165 The top ten broadband access providers, each of which
has a monopoly on network access provision in its own region, control over
eighty-three percent of the market for broadband access in the U.S. (and the
top two cable companies and the top two DSL companies together control
more than fifty percent of that market).166 Over forty percent of homes in
the U.S. have access to no more than one provider of broadband (either
cable or DSL).167 In essence, broadband access in the U.S. is controlled by
regional duopolists, despite FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s statements
characterizing this market as fiercely competitive.168
This regional duopoly structure has led to a complete lack of price

163

“We ought to have a universal, affordable access for broadband technology by the
year 2007, and then we ought to make sure as soon as possible thereafter, consumers have
got plenty of choices when it comes to purchasing the broadband carrier. See, the more
choices there are, the more the price will go down. And the more the price goes down, the
more users there will be. And the more users there will be, the more likely it is America
will stay on the competitive edge of world trade.” Remarks by President George W. Bush,
March
26,
2004,
Albuquerque,
N.M.,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-9.html.
164
S. Derek Turner, Broadband Reality Check II: The Truth Behind America’s Digital
Decline, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf
[hereinafter Reality Check] (describing regional duopolies controlled by cable and
telephone providers).
165
FCC, High-Speed Services for Internet Access, Status as of Dec. 2005, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-266596A1.pdf [hereinafter 2005
Broadband Report].
166
Reality Check, supra note __, citing Leichtman Research Group May 2006 report.
The top five broadband providers in the U.S. are Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, Time Warner,
and Cox. Id.
167
2005 Broadband Report, supra note __.
168
Reality Check, supra note __, citing Chairman Kevin Martin (“Broadband
platforms are engaged in fierce competition. ... In addition to telephone and cable
providers, broadband access is increasingly being delivered to consumers via satellite,
wireless, and fiber or powerline providers....This competition is leading to broadband
providers offering customers faster and faster connections at lower and lower prices.”) In
fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that access is provided by
regional duopolies of cable and DSL providers. GAO Report, Broadband Deployment is
Extensive Throughout the United States, But It Is Difficult to Assess the Extent of
Deployment Gaps in Rural Areas, GAO-06-426, May 2006. Prices for broadband access
are going up, rather than down, and wireless, powerline, and satellite together account for
less than two percent of broadband access services in America.
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competition for standalone broadband access.169 It has also led to a
complete lack of desire on either cable or DSL providers’ parts to provide
access to their competitors – either access to competitive ISPs who might
use their wholesale lines to sell retail services to others or access to their
new perceived competitors in the online “content delivery” marketplace.
None of the large network providers in the U.S. arguably is under any
competitive or regulatory pressure to open up. All of these actors appear to
be focused on vertical integration, monetization, and discrimination.170
At the same time, the telephony and cable players in the U.S. are
consolidating. The old AT&T monopoly of the pre-divestiture 1970s is reforming.171 In 2005, SBC Communications acquired AT&T and decided to
169

See, e.g., Kagan Research report, Jul. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.kagan.com/ContentDetail.aspx?group=5&id=216. Kagan did a national survey
of the five top cable operators and four telephone companies for the first quarter of 2006.
The average price for cable modem service was $39.45 per month. For DSL, it was $35.38.
Verizon was the lowest, averaging $31.62 per month, while BellSouth was the highest,
with a monthly rate of $42.25. Prices for standalone broadband access “show little sign of
price competition.” Id.
170
In the past ten years, telecommunications, broadcasting and cable companies have
spent more than half a billion dollars on lobbying efforts. See Common Cause report, Mar.
2006 report, available at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C17E2-CDD14DF6-92BE-BD4429893665%7D/TELECOM-LOBBYING-DATA.PDF. See, e.g., Apr.
3, 2006; BellSouth statement on network neutrality: “Broadband network providers should
be able to offer different plans that feature enhanced levels of service or that promote their
own brand names and products or the services of selected vendors. For example, BellSouth
should be able to enter into arrangements with content providers by which the content
provider pays for special treatment, such as preferential listing or faster downloads from
that provider’s website or receiving higher quality of service.” Dionne Searcy and Amy
Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006
(quoting Verizon’s Ivan Seidenberg: “We have to make sure they [content providers] don't
sit on our network and chew up our capacity. We need to pay for the pipe.”), available at
http://www.freepress.net/news/13218; Vince Vittore, Cable flying under net neutrality
ONLINE,
Mar.
6,
2006,
available
at
radar,
TELEPHONY
http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom_cable_flying_net/ (noting introduction of
products that will allow cable network managers to prioritize their own content while
relegating other material to “best efforts” status). Joseph Waz, Keynote Remarks,
Broadband Policy Summit, Washington, D.C., May 10, 2006 (calling for freedom for
“network builders”); Dan Brenner, NCTA, April 25, 2006 NPR remarks, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5362403: “Companies that have
spent money and have not been rewarded by Wall Street....[like cable] allow[] companies
like Google to thrive.. . Let’s say someone wanted to get a broadband delivery of a
wedding. Companies should be able to charge for this. ”
171
As of January 1, 1984, AT&T’s local operations were split into seven independent
Regional Bell Operating Companies known as “Baby Bells.” The resulting Baby Bells
were originally Ameritech (now part of AT&T), Bell Atlantic (now part of Verizon),
BellSouth (Merging with AT&T pending regulatory approval), NYNEX (now part of
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use the AT&T name for the combined company.172 In response, Verizon
acquired MCI, which in the past was AT&T’s competitor for long-distance
services.173 Now the new AT&T and Bell South have merged, bringing
control of wireless carrier Cingular within a single company.174 Comcast,
the largest cable operator in the U.S., and Time Warner, the second largest
operator, jointly acquired Adelphia (the fifth largest operator) in 2006.175 In
general, internet access infrastructure is dominated in the west by AT&T
and in the east by Verizon, with cable companies Comcast and Time
Warner operating nationally. The internet access services market is
unquestionably highly concentrated.176
As part of their campaign to fight back against the undermining
influences of human online communications, telephony and cable
incumbents would like to reinstantiate their prior services online. “[T]hey
Verizon), Pacific Telesis Group (now part of AT&T), Southwestern Bell Corporation (now
part of AT&T) and US West (now part of Qwest). This separation of competitive long
distance services from monopoly local exchange services was driven by "skepticism that
regulatory authorities could otherwise stop an integrated monopoly from engaging in
predatory conduct (such as discriminatory interconnection) in adjacent markets.” Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 85 (2003). Because there has been fierce litigation over what rates an incumbent
should be able to charge for use of its equipment, the interconnection/unbundling regime
prescribed by the 1996 Act has failed. Meanwhile, competitive (non-incumbent) local
exchange telephone companies are going out of business, as are internet service providers,
and the Bell Operating Companies are re-combining. According to Wikipedia, “Of the 24
Bell Operating Companies which AT&T owned or in which it held a minority interest prior
to the 1984 federally mandated split of the company, 12 will be a part of the new AT&T
Inc. upon the completion of their proposed acquisition of BellSouth announced on March
5,
2006.”
Wikipedia
entry,
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT&T#Creation_of_AT.26T.2CInc.
172
SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp., Applications for Approval of Transfer
of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290 (2005).
173
Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer
of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 200 FCC Rcd 18433 (2005).
174
Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from BellSouth Corporation, Transferor, to AT&T Inc., Transferee, WC
Dkt. No. 06-74 (filed Mar. 31, 2006).
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Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses,
Adelphia Communications Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees;
Adelphia communications Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferree;
Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum
Opinion and Oder, MB Docket no. 05-192 (rel. July 21, 2006); erratum, MB Docket No.
05-192 (rel. July 27, 2006).
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Marguerite Reardon, AT&T and BellSouth: Why You Should Care, NEWS.COM,
Nov. 7, 2006. AT&T now controls half the telephone and internet access lines in the U.S.
– half the access infrastructure in this country, as well as all of Cingular Wireless. Id.
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are combining services—fixed and mobile telephony, broadband internet
access and television—to sell as a single ‘converged’ bundle.”177 This is
the “triple-play” (or, sometimes, “quadruple-play”) so enamored of Wall
Street and telecommunications executives.178 These network providers
claim that they will have no incentive to improve the penetration of
broadband services in the United States if they are not given the power to
control their networks and sell separately-prioritized, guaranteed services.179
But because the transport layer for internet access is not competitive,
deregulation of that layer is inappropriate.180
In particular, newly-renewed behemoth AT&T has been active in at
least three ways with regard to its desire to dumb down and monetize online
human interactions. First, AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre’s remarks began the
network neutrality uproar, and provide evidence that AT&T intends to
discriminate.181 Second, AT&T has been careful to ensure that upload
177

Here We Go Again, Sort Of, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2006.
But not perhaps a consumer’s favorite option. See Yuki Noguchi, No Bundle of
Joy, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2006. The telephone incumbents are pleasing Wall Street
through their bundling plans. See Verizon briefing session with analysts, Sept. 27, 2006
(“We have a lot of things going on to win the hearts and minds of our customers . . .
including convergence, which we don’t actually think is easily replicated by some of our
competitors. We are building the network. We are offering differentiated products at
competitive prices with good returns...”) at 25 of transcript. During this same briefing,
Verizon representatives discussed the revenue opportunities associated with interactive
advertising embedded in IP-enabled television shows. Transcript at 8. This kind of IPenabled transactional relationship requires deep control over and information about who is
watching what.
179
The United States ranks 16th in the world in terms of its broadband penetration.
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), available at http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/statistics/at_glance/top20_broad_2005.html. (Dec. 2005 figures). For an example of
a network provider’s assertion that without guaranteed control it will not improve
broadband penetration in this country, see Tom Tauke, Verizon EVP, Remarks at Media
Institute Luncheon, Jul. 11, 2006, at 10-11 (“Improving the Internet will require the
investment of substantial amounts of risk capital. If government policies reduce the
opportunity to earn a return on that investment, network operators simply won’t be able to
deploy them.”), available at http://www.mediainstitute.org/Speeches/Tauke_07112006.pdf.
180
See United States Trade Representative, Results of the 2006 Section 1377 Review of
Telecommunications Trade Agreements, at 10 (commenting on Deutsche Telekom request
for a “regulatory holiday”): “While the United States strongly supports deregulation as an
important element of promoting facilities-based competition, the promotion of deregulation
before competitive conditions warrant such steps may undermine the development of an
efficient and competitive market.” Id.
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See supra note __. AT&T CEO Edward Whitacre has said that Google and other
companies "'use my lines for free--and that's bull."' Spencer E. Ante & Roger O. Crockett,
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Competitive in the Broadband Era, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 110. Whitacre states "'I ain't
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speeds (access speeds that allow humans to add to the complex system of
human communications) are far slower than download – even though there
is no technical reason for this asymmetry.182 And third, in a recent
AT&T/BellSouth merger agreement, AT&T was careful to exclude from
any network neutrality argument its highspeed fiber access networks – the
connections that will define internet access into the future.183
3. What Happens to Human Online Communications?
The internet of the present day is characterized (as far as we
know)
by nondiscriminatory transport of packets by routers that are
indifferent to the application being used, the source or destination of the
packet, or the content of the communication. If this set of practices changes
in favor of network-provider-run discrimination, much less replacement of
the internet by wholly proprietary IP broadband networks, we will see a
dramatic change in the communication patterns of the last ten years. It is
not just that application or content providers will need to pay a toll for
prioritized routing – it is also that all non-prioritized communications will
184

going to let them do that.... [T]here's going to have to be some mechanism for these people
who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using."' At SBC, It's All About "Scale and
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Nov.
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2005,
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customer not upgrading to the more expensive service. Verizon currently charges $19.95
for 768K/128K and AT&T charges a similar amount. For the same operational cost, they
could provide 768K symmetric. See email David Burstein to Susan Crawford, Jan. 15,
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blog
post,
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We have no data about what is actually happening inside incumbent network
providers’ networks, because they are privately run. See Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis, COMMONS Workshop Final Report, Feb. 7, 2007, available at
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become instantly second-rate and undesirable because of their slow speed
and doubtful transmission.
To generations accustomed to centrally-controlled entertainment
modalities like television and cable, this limitation to “channels” provided
by network providers may not seem important. Surely there will be vast
amounts of digitized material to absorb online. Why should it matter
whether some of it is prioritized? The reason this prioritization matters is
that we do not know what new forms of group-oriented collaborative
interactions (social, commercial, or cultural), or what kinds of new ideas,
will emerge from this network of networks. Prioritization will make a
difference because that network providers will cease to be commodity
transport-providers and will instead become gatekeepers, pickers-ofwinners, and controllers-of-experiences on a massive scale. The diversity
of online experiences, and thus the range of freedom of human connection,
human relationships, and the diverse generation of new ideas will
diminish.185 Neutrality of symmetric highspeed access is important for a
host of reasons: it will enable diverse new applications to emerge that are
not controlled by network providers; it will cause new forms of interaction
to grow, even apart from the introduction of applications; and it will enable
diversity in various real-time communications that otherwise will be
controlled and monetized by the network providers. All of this diversity has
great potential to be positively associated with economic growth.
One frequent argument against network neutrality is that users want
simplicity. Verizon representatives talk animatedly about the need for an
interface for online broadcasts that can be controlled in the dark with one
hand – because the other hand will be busy holding a beer.186 But this
conception of user behavior shows a lack of imagination. People do want to
relax and be entertained, and Americans have great strengths in this domain,
but network neutrality is not incompatible with either simplicity or high
entertainment value. The key question is who will be in a position to
control access to simple and highly-entertaining activities and engagements
provided online. If network providers act as gatekeepers, deciding which
new ideas will fail and which will succeed, then they will be artificially
amplifying particular ideas. Instead of the internet, we will have a broadcast
television network, in which success is decided on “from above” rather than
185

See HUNDT, IN CHINA’S SHADOW 58 (“In the face of incumbent power, the United
States should emphasize change, experimentation, high tolerance for failure, and rapidity of
captial turnover as the key characteristics of its economy.”)
186
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emerging from the interactions of agents.
D. Implications for Policy: Divestiture
Because the incumbent telcos have obtained from the states the
video franchise relief that drove them to seek legislative help in 2006,
network neutrality will need to be a federal-level, standalone effort.187 We
need to treat highspeed access to the internet as a utility – connectivity as
basic infrastructure -- so that users can choose what they want to do with
the access they are provided. We are one of very few countries whose
communications infrastructure is privately owned, and therefore to us the
idea of treating these pipes and wires as a utility like electricity or gas
service seems radical. But because our future economic growth could be so
greatly affected by the policies we apply to this pipe, we should take the
long view. We have no greater opportunity to increase our nation’s
economic growth rate than by encouraging the emergence of new ideas via
the human communications layer of the internet.
For nearly eighty years, between 1900 and 1980, AT&T
successfully fended off interconnection with its facilities by its competitors
and prevented the attachment to its networks of devices made by
independent manufacturers. AT&T was a collection of fully-integrated
functions and services: the Bell Operating Companies provided local
telephone service, Western Electric made all the equipment, AT&T
provided long distance service, and Bell Labs designed equipment. People
were confident that having a single integrated system was simply efficient;
local and long distance service were viewed as natural monopolies.188
AT&T, then the world’s largest corporation, claimed that competitors’
“cream skimming” would threaten AT&T’s ability to provide universal
service, result in higher prices for local telephone service, and harm
consumers. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Communications
Commission seemed unable to control AT&T’s behavior in markets for
long distance service and telecommunications products, and the AT&T
name began to stand for abusive monopolistic behavior – high-priced,
187

Id. at 35: “Q: What are the regulatory assumptions underlying all of this? . . . A:
We have Virginia, we have Texas, we have Florida, we have California, we have New
Jersey. We have almost all of Maryland, because they are very big counties, and so what
we don’t have is teeny. . . I feel that the franchising is not holding us back.. . I really don’t
see that as a necessity to have a nationwide relief on that.”
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Lawrence A. Sullivan & Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust Consent Decree: Should
Congress Change the Rules?, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 233, 235 (1990).
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insufficient service and avoidance of competition -- assisted by government
action.189 Courts, the Commission, and legislators went along, unconvinced
that competition was in the public interest when it came to the “natural
monopoly” of telecommunications.
Just as AT&T is now being re-created through merger, Ma Bell’s
pre-divestiture views as to how best to serve the public good are enjoying a
renaissance in the highspeed internet access era. The key arguments made
long ago by Theodore Vail – that universal service, local access abilities,
and overall consumer welfare would best be served by unconstrained and
vertically integrated providers – are reappearing. Given the political power,
great wealth, and market position of the current network owners, nothing
short of quarantine – or divestiture190 – will protect us from either
predictably predatory actions by the operators or endless efforts by them to
undermine through litigation whatever lesser rules are put in place.191
The risks involved in letting private regional monopolies control
access to the idea-generation facilities of the human communications layer
of the internet are far greater than the risks of getting government involved
in ensuring divestiture, network neutrality, and universal access. These
monopoly access providers arguably have much greater incentives to stifle
the generation of new ideas than our government does, and whatever flurry
of “internet regulation” is prompted by government involvement in access
provision (a subject that is beyond the scope of this Article) will be
extremely difficult to enforce. It is likely that the network architecture is
already in place that is capable of making highspeed access possible.192
189

Here is Lily Tomlin, as Ernestine the phone operator in 1976: “We handle eightyfour billion calls a year. Serving everyone from presidents and kings to the scum of the
earth. We realize that every so often you can't get an operator, for no apparent reason your
phone goes out of order, or perhaps you get charged for a call you didn't make. We don't
care. Watch this.. [ she hits buttons maniacally ] ..just lost Peoria.” [voiceover: We don't
care. We don't have to. We're the Phone Company.]
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Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications under Judge Greene, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1403 (1999) (“The MFJ’s lasting lesson for public policy is that, at
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That transport needs to be separated from all decisions about which
particular packets to favor.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and industry spokespeople arguing against network
neutrality present their claims in support of vertical integration as the
logical outputs of neutral, mathematical algorithms. On a closer look,
however, the arguments they are making are neither neutral nor persuasive.
They are based on a supply-chain view of communications that dictates
optimizing infrastructure for a particular kind of use – and that takes the
systemic, human reality of communications as exogenous. Stripped of
unrealistic economic justifications, their acceptance of duopoly control over
highspeed access in this country is nothing less than a signal that Ma Bell
has indeed been reconstituted. This approach is sharply undermined by the
arrival of the internet, which teaches us that infrastructure need not be
inextricably intertwined with communication, and by new developments in
economic growth theory. It is high time we recognized the importance of
new ideas to economic growth in our approach to communications law.
My central point is that, given that economic growth is created by
the emergence of new ideas, the proper role of government should be to
support the diversity of complex social interactions online. Scholars who
argue about the wealth effects on telecommunications providers of
particular regimes are focused on a small subset of the story. It is the large
and diverse online world of interactions and ideas out there that matters, and
simplifying (de-complexifying) that ecosystem is a step toward economic
peril.
Congress now has the opportunity to adopt a coherent approach to
the internet that takes proper account of the importance of the diversity of
the communications carried across it – in part by acting decisively to
separate control over transport from control over provision of
communications. We need to reframe all of communications law to support
what matters. What matters are communications themselves and the
increasingly diverse and valuable ideas they produce.

http://www.newnetworks.com/broadbandscandals.htm.

